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ABSTRACT
In today’s polarized social and political climate, rural alienation from
government is often dismissed as “just more politics” or a symptom of
problematic cultural norms. This Article takes rural disaffection from
government seriously, with a focus on rural relationships with the federal
regulatory state. The Article argues that rural disaffection from the
regulatory state is not solely a cultural or political phenomenon among
white conservatives. Rural disaffection is also a broader structural issue
that stems in part from the regulatory state’s crisis of legitimacy.
Two factors show that rural disaffection from the regulatory state is
more diffuse and profound than is often appreciated, implicating the
regulatory state’s capacity to elicit deference among those it governs. First,
as illustrated with a robust synthesis of socio-legal literature on rural
views, racially and politically diverse rural populations exhibit
overlapping themes of distrust toward the regulatory state based in
perceptions of procedural exclusion, agencies’ disregard for local
conditions, and arbitrary substantive outcomes. This broad, intersectional
rural disaffection suggests at least some of the problem lies with the
regulatory state itself. Second, objective, structural features of the
regulatory state align with rural populations’ subjective accounts,
including the failure of cost-benefit analysis to accommodate salient rural
conditions and the unique, under-mitigated impacts of regulatory
developments in rural regions. The pervasive nature of rural disaffection
alongside the alignment of structural factors with subjective rural accounts
together lend credence to rural populations’ sentiments, in turn evoking
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common concerns about democratic accountability and inadequately
guided decisionmaking within the regulatory state.
This Article contemplates possibilities for reform based in
recognized pathways to help establish institutional legitimacy—including
procedural, distributive, and restorative justice—with a view to defusing
rural alienation’s destabilizing influence while working toward a
regulatory state that is more trustworthy, effective, and fair for all.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Rural communities are associated with heightened rates of
antigovernment sentiment.1 This skepticism or hostility toward
government tends to involve the federal government in particular.2 The
nature and significance of this anti-federal sentiment are regular topics of
academic and political contestation.3
1. See Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163,
1207 (2018).
2. See, e.g., Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress Without Limitation: The
Property Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1, 118–19
(2001) (describing County Supremacy movement and longstanding “tenuous relationship”
between local landowners and local employees of federal agencies); W. Ryan
Stephens, Gray Wolf Rising: Why the Clash Over Wolf Management in the Northern
Rockies Calls for Congressional Action to Define “Recovery” Under the Endangered
Species Act, 36 WM. & MARY ENV’T. L. & POL’Y REV. 917, 920 (2012); Dante Chinni, Tea
Party Mapped: How Big Is It and Where Is It Based?, PUB. BROAD. SERV. (Apr. 21, 2010,
12:30 PM) https://to.pbs.org/3AUOLA7 (explaining that the Tea Party movement was
particularly popular in rural counties). State and local governments also receive their fair
share of ire. For instance, Katherine Cramer’s book, “The Politics of Resentment” largely
focuses on rural antipathy toward Wisconsin’s state environmental agency. See generally
KATHERINE J. CRAMER, THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT: RURAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE
RISE OF SCOTT WALKER (2016) (articulating theory of rural political consciousness and
anti-government resentment based on ethnographic study conducted in Wisconsin from
2007 to 2012).
3. See generally Schragger, supra note 1, at 1208 (describing antigovernment antiurbanism as “draw[ing] a direct connection between bigness and the loss of liberty”); Rick
Su, Democracy in Rural America, 98 N.C. L. REV. 837, 872 (2020) (arguing that rural
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The persistence of this contestation is unsurprising because rural
antigovernment sentiment is complicated. Some antigovernment
sentiment is culturally driven. Rural cultural norms have traditionally been
linked to “live-and-let-live” philosophies and an embrace of self-reliance
that help explain skepticism of government actors perceived as either
physically and culturally distant or needlessly meddlesome.4 As an
extreme example of the potential cultural nature of anti-federal sentiment,
certain rural, antigovernment militants in the West are reportedly
motivated by unique religious dogma.5 Some antigovernment sentiment
can also be explained by sociopolitical tensions both old and new. “Hating
big government” and wanting to “drain the swamp in Washington” are
regular talking points of right-wing media, xenophobic states’ rights
advocates, and the conspiracy theorists that have captured the imagination
of many within our highly polarized society.6
This Article contemplates that, in addition to these factors, some
distrust of federal institutions in rural communities can be explained by
federal laws and structures systematically disadvantaging or otherwise
having tangible negative impacts in rural communities.7 In other words,
frustration with state government “pales in comparison to the particular disdain that rural
residents have long reserved for the federal government”); CRAMER, supra note 2, at 17
(articulating the importance of understanding rural populations’ understanding of
government); ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND: DECLINE AND RAGE IN SMALL-TOWN
AMERICA (2018) (examining outrage toward federal government throughout rural
America); ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING
ON THE AMERICAN RIGHT (2016) (examining opposition to federal government in
Louisiana).
4. See Lisa R. Pruitt & Bradley E. Showman, Law Stretched Thin: Access to Justice
in Rural America, 59 S.D. L. REV. 466, 489 (2014); Kenneth A. Stahl, Preemption,
Federalism, and Local Democracy, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 133, 143–44 (2017). See
generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1994) (investigating ranching
population’s disregard for formal rules in favor of informal rules in conducting their
relations); Erin Morrow, The Environmental Front: Cultural Warfare in the West, 25 J.
LAND RES. & ENV’T. L. 183, 185 (2005) [hereinafter Morrow, Environmental Front]
(describing New Mexico ranchers as “distrustful of ‘anything that smacks of more
government control’”).
5. See John Sepulvado, Why the Bundy Militia Mixes Mormon Symbolism with AntiGovernment Sentiment, PUB. BROAD. SERV. (Jan. 4, 2016, 5:29 PM),
https://to.pbs.org/3GvRKjn.
6. Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Purpose in A Populist Era, 98 NEB. L. REV.
543, 552–54 (2019) (describing nineteenth-century roots of modern right-wing populism).
7. See Su, supra note 3, at 872–73 (noting discourse’s emphasis on rural values as
explaining rural antipathy toward federal government but arguing that “how federal
authority is exercised in rural areas” deserves more attention as an explanatory factor);
Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J.
2054, 2064–65 (2017) (arguing that attributing criminal justice concerns to “criminality”
erases structural conditions, including law); see also Zachary Bray, Monuments of Folly:
How Local Governments Can Challenge Confederate “Statue Statutes,” 91 TEMP. L. REV.
1, 6 (2018) (characterizing “urban/rural divide” as partly cultural, “but also structural”);
Ganesh Sitaraman, Christopher Serkin & Morgan Ricks, Regulation and the Geography of
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the Article theorizes that some antigovernment sentiment may simply be a
rational reaction to government doing a less-than-optimal job.8 It may be
difficult to untangle the role of law and public institutions as drivers of
rural antigovernment sentiment from factors of culture and politics.
However, looking at the other side of the mirror of antigovernment
sentiment—i.e., what government is actually doing—may illuminate
concrete steps for reform that could potentially help defuse the other
factors at play.9
This Article focuses on rural antigovernment sentiment directed
toward the federal regulatory state. “Regulatory state” refers here to
federal agencies, the regulations they promulgate and enforce, their
localized land use management practices, and these activities’ roles in
structuring our political economy.10
Perceptions of the federal regulatory state among those who live in
smaller, remote towns and sparsely populated counties warrant attention
for several reasons. First, the regulatory state has transformed substantially
over the past several decades.11 Its changed areas of emphasis since the
1970s range from deregulating the transportation sector to increasing
regulation of natural resources.12 Many of these areas of transformation
bear unique implications for rural communities that could help explain
some rural frustrations.13 For instance, a loss of intercity bus service (due
to federal deregulation) alongside a simultaneous encroachment into local
Inequality, DUKE L.J. 1763, 1767–68 (2021) (critiquing dominant explanations for rural
decline focused solely on “inexorable economic trends”).
8. See Morrow, Environmental Front, supra note 4, at 185 (arguing that “‘rural antienvironmentalism’ is not an inherent cultural belief but a “natural, and possibly
unavoidable, response to the current regulatory framework”).
9. Cf. Loka Ashwood, Rural Conservatism or Anarchism? The Pro-state, Stateless,
and Anti-state Positions, 83 RURAL SOCIO. 717, 719 (2018) (suggesting that most studies of
rural politics and rural political attitudes vis-à-vis the state remain superficial).
10. See generally Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369 (2016) (discussing relationships between regulatory state
and political economy). “Regulatory state” is used interchangeably in this discussion with
“administrative state.”
11. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998) (describing
twentieth-century transition of regulatory approach to core common carrier and public
utility industries away from priorities of reliability and non-discrimination to modern
model of promoting competition and maximizing consumer choice).
12. See discussion infra Part IV.
13. Cf. Pruitt & Showman, supra note 4, at 466, 480–83. (discussing rural spatiality
and economic landscape characterized by substandard infrastructure, human capital
deficits, and lack of economic diversification); LOKA ASHWOOD, FOR-PROFIT DEMOCRACY:
WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS LOSING THE TRUST OF RURAL AMERICA, 123 (2018) (discussing
rural environmental embeddedness); Hannah Haksgaard, Rural Women and Developments
in the Undue Burden Analysis: The Effect of Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 65
DRAKE L. REV. 663, 686 (2017) (arguing that rurality should be considered a unique and
significant part of lived experiences in intersectional analyses).
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economic activity (due to federal regulations implementing, for instance,
the Endangered Species Act) could help explain a perception of the federal
government pulling the rug out from under the community with one hand
while pushing them over with the other. Given that, in this example,
federal regulations were helping rural communities less and asking more
of them than before in ways that seem to disproportionately interact with
rural regions’ unique geographic features—including greater distances to
travel and a greater dependence on land-based livelihoods—that
perception would not be entirely baseless.14
Second, scholars posit that rural communities are more intimately
involved with at least some federal agencies than urban or suburban
communities are.15 This would make sense in light of many rural
communities’ closer proximity to vast expanses of public lands, greater
dependence on natural resource-based work, and heavier involvement
with agriculture.16 This means that rural communities may be more
directly answerable to federal agencies than other populations—and
perhaps, therefore, federal agencies ought to be more answerable to them.
Yet, oft-queried problems with agencies’ direct democratic accountability
are implicated in the seemingly tense relationships between rural
communities and federal agencies.17 The fact that federal regulations are
such a political flashpoint for rural communities in and of itself suggests
that deeper inquiry is warranted.
Third, administrative law scholarship has begun to recognize that
certain aspects of agency decisionmaking have a geography problem.18
This is in addition to other recurring critiques of central components of the
regulatory apparatus, such as problems with cost-benefit analysis
emphasizing aggregate welfare and efficiency as its main priorities over

14. See Paul Stephen Demsey, The Dark Side of Deregulation: Its Impact on Small
Communities, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 445 (1987); see also Holly Firlein, Continental Divides:
How Wolf Conservation in the United States and Europe Impacts Rural Attitudes, 45
ECOLOGY L.Q. 327, 338 (2018) (arguing that rural residents bear disproportionate burdens
of wolf conservation and failures to consider rural needs fuels rural “antigovernment
sentiment,” raising questions about “basic fairness” and democratic structures).
15. See Su, supra note 3, at 867, 873 (observing that federal agencies are more
involved in rural communities but not directly responsive to local constituents).
16. See generally Ann Eisenberg, Distributive Justice and Rural America, 61 B.C. L.
REV. 189 (2020) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Distributive Justice] (discussing traditional and
modern rural livelihoods).
17. See infra, Parts II–III.
18. Cf. Brigham Daniels et al., Just Environmentalism, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1,
8 (2018) (arguing that due to inattention to conflicts between environmental protection and
economic externalities, “justice . . . in the context of environmental protection or natural
resource preservation is an open and neglected question”); Richard L. Revesz, Regulation
and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1489 (2018) (arguing that “mak[ing]
distributional consequences a core concern of the regulatory state” is needed to reduce
opposition to “socially beneficial regulations”).
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distributional concerns, exacerbating socioeconomic inequality.19 Thus, an
analysis of the relationship between rural populations and the regulatory
state should be revealing, both for shedding light on the problem of rural
disaffection from government—which contributes to broader problems of
urban/rural polarization—and for the path forward to pursuing an
administrative state that is fair and effective.
One way to better understand the nature of rural distrust of the federal
regulatory state is to expand the scope of inquiry beyond the conservative,
white populations who have received so much attention in scholarship and
public commentary to date. Such an investigative expansion is worthwhile
in its own right. “Rural” is most commonly defined, at least in law, as a
type of place, and not a type of person.20 Yet, the rural populations saddled
with disproportionate poverty burdens and longstanding, ongoing histories
of publicly driven oppression tend to be the Black, Native American, and
19. See generally Karen Tani, The Limits of the Cost-Benefit Worldview: A
Disability-Informed Perspective, L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT (Oct. 12, 2021),
https://bit.ly/34kQQJG (critiquing cost-benefit analysis because cost will inevitably be
reason to say “no” to necessary measures and for creating artificially narrow lenses on
important moral questions); Melissa Luttrell & Jorge Roman-Romero, Modernizing
Regulatory Review Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis, L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT (Oct. 11,
2021), https://bit.ly/3LgZYzK (arguing that cost-benefit analysis cannot be salvaged
through reform due to its inherent classism, racism, and ableism); Elizabeth Popp Berman,
Let’s Politicize Cost-Benefit Analysis, L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT (Oct. 5, 2021),
https://bit.ly/3uvsuYc (arguing that progressives should be more strategic in approaching
cost-benefit analysis, recognizing it as a “convenient fiction” conservatives deploy to
achieve less regulation in general); Zachary Liscow, Equity in Regulatory Cost-Benefit
Analysis, L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT (Oct. 4, 2021), https://bit.ly/3gus0ta (arguing that
distributional concerns are missing in regulatory analysis); Lisa Heinzerling, Climate
Change, Racial Justice, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT (Sept. 28,
2021), https://bit.ly/3J6TSjp (noting that President Biden’s stated commitments to racial
justice and climate change on the one hand and to continuing to use cost-benefit analysis
on the other “are trains racing toward each other on the same track”); Frank Pasquale, CostBenefit Analysis at a Crossroads: A Symposium on the Future of Quantitative Policy
Evaluation, L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT (Sept. 27, 2021), https://bit.ly/3guDjlo (arguing that
to address modern crises, cost-benefit analysis must be used to enable regulation rather
than slow it); see also Jedediah Purdy, The Long Environmental Justice Movement, 44
ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 864 (2018) (arguing that environmental law has generally neglected
questions of socioeconomic inequality).
20. The U.S. Census Bureau defines “rural” as any population not in an urban area.
See How
Does
the
US Census Bureau
Define Rural?,
Rural
America,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://bit.ly/3KpQLnf (last visited Mar. 8, 2022). An urban area is
defined as incorporated localities of 2,500 or more persons. Id. This discussion takes a
broader view of rural as a concept encompassing places that are geographically isolated,
limited in population, and/or unattached to a larger regional economy. See, e.g., Jessica A.
Shoemaker, Fee Simple Failures: Rural Landscapes and Race, 119 MICH. L. REV. 1695,
1703 n.46 (2021) (noting that the article’s property law “analysis does not depend on
granular distinctions between urban and rural” and that the definition of “rural” is a
“subject of significant debate”); Elizabeth Weeks, One Child Town: The Health Care
Exceptionalism Case Against Agglomeration Economies, 2021 UTAH L. REV. 319, 330
(2021) (discussing varied and competing definitions of “rural”).
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Latinx populations who have made headlines far less frequently than white
conservatives, and who also tend to have different political leanings.21
There are bound to be differences in rural experiences across racial lines,
given that white populations have not been subject to the racist policies
and practices that have displaced and marginalized so many rural people
of color.22 Still, if rural communities of diverse racial, cultural, and
political backgrounds exhibit some overlapping themes of skepticism of
the federal regulatory state, such a finding would suggest that at least part
of rural anti-federal alienation lies with the regulatory state itself and
should not be dismissed as merely an example of radical rural politics. 23
Another way to assess rural distrust of the regulatory state as a
sociopolitical phenomenon versus a structural problem is to assess
whether objective structural aspects of the regulatory state align with
disaffected rural populations’ subjective views. Perceptions and
sentiments shared through a subjective lens are relatively easy to
discredit.24 Commentators might find a variety of reasons to be dismissive
of rural residents’ accounts of their frustrations with the regulatory state in
the absence of tangible evidence to support those accounts. Some might
be tempted to attribute rural antipathy to widespread misinformation,25
“tribalism” and related cultural and political commitments,26 human

21. Cf. Shoemaker, supra note 20, at 1707–08; Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, 39
CONN. L. REV. 159, 168–73 (2006) (discussing nature and persistence of rural stereotypes);
OLUGBENGA AJILORE, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE ROLE OF RURAL COMMUNITIES OF
COLOR IN THE 2020 ELECTION (Dec. 22, 2020), https://ampr.gs/3rkXo3I (discussing mixed,
though mostly liberal, political leanings of various populations of color in rural regions).
22. See, e.g., Priya Baskaran, Thirsty Places, 2021 UTAH L. REV. 501, 560 (2021);
Shoemaker, supra note 20, at 1712–21; Maybell Romero, Rural Spaces, Communities of
Color, and the Progressive Prosecutor, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 819–21
(2020); Valena E. Beety, Prosecuting Opioid Use, Punishing Rurality, 80 OHIO ST. L.J.
741, 761 (2019); Thomas Mitchell, Destabilizing the Normalization of Rural Black Land
Loss: A Critical Role for Legal Empiricism, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 557, 564–65 (2005).
23. Cf. Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial
Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 313, 320 (2013)
(noting limited literature on how to measure agency legitimacy).
24. Cf. Michael Carolan, The Rural Problem: Justice in the Countryside, 85 RURAL
SOCIO. 22, 23, 50 (2019) (noting commentators’ propensity to “ascribe irrationality” to
rural behaviors and arguing that this tendency inhibits “mak[ing] sense of what is
happening in the countryside”).
25. See, e.g., Neil D. Hamilton, Myth Making in the Heartland - Did Agriculture
Elect the New President?, 13 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 5 (2017).
26. See Neil Fulton, Fake News on Trial: The Jury Trial as a Guard Against Societal
Entropy, 52 TEX. TECH L. REV. 743, 745 (2020) (defining “tribalism” as “us versus them
worldview” demanding loyalty to “homogeneous enclaves”).
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tendencies toward irrationality,27 and other flaws of human cognition.28 A
comparison with objective structural conditions can inform how rural
perspectives align with verifiable factors, in turn helping inform how much
credibility those perspectives warrant in the broader societal conversation.
This Article draws on a synthesis of literature on rural perceptions of
the regulatory state, legitimacy theory, and a critical assessment of federal
administrative law and institutions to advance a two-fold thesis. The first
argument is that although representative experiences do differ across
diverse rural populations, ample qualitative evidence suggests that
disaffection with the regulatory state is not merely an ideological
phenomenon among rural, white conservatives. The permeation of
disaffection across rural communities suggests that this alienation is also,
at least partly, a symptom of a problem of governance, evoking concerns
about the regulatory state’s legitimacy.
In particular, white rural populations are typically associated with
views that the regulatory state is a threat to traditional, land-based
livelihoods, such as mining, ranching, fishing, hunting, and forestry.29
Meanwhile, rural populations of color tend to see the regulatory state as
either perpetuating environmental injustices or not offering enough
protection from them.30 Yet, a robust synthesis of relevant literature
reveals that these themes can be cross-cutting: rural communities of color
often also view the regulatory state as a threat to livelihoods, while white
rural communities also perceive it as implicated in environmental
injustice. Further, although many success stories exist of harmonious
relationships between rural communities and federal agencies, diverse
rural populations view the regulatory state as procedurally exclusive,
detached from local conditions, and failing to serve their interests.31
Viewed holistically, this collective and intersectional rural
disaffection from the regulatory state points toward a crisis of legitimacy
within the regulatory state. For purposes of this discussion, “legitimacy”
is defined as government institutions’ ability to elicit deference and
obedience in governed populations based on the populations’ sense that
the institutions are fair and trustworthy.32 This legitimacy problem
27. See Jon D. Hanson; & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 745 (1999).
28. See generally Nancy Levit, Confronting Conventional Thinking: The Heuristics
Problem in Feminist Legal Theory, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 391 (2006) (discussing human
tendencies toward systematic psychological biases and inaccurate predictions).
29. See discussion infra Part III.
30. See discussion infra Part III.
31. See discussion infra Part III.
32. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Power, Process, and Automated Decision-Making, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 613, 614 n.12 (2019) (discussing competing definitions of “legitimacy”);
Bell, supra note 7, at 2071 (discussing under-theorized relationship between concept of
distrust and legitimacy theory). Legitimacy is not defined here as a question of
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implicates administrative law scholarship’s concern with democratic
accountability and arbitrary substantive decisionmaking within the
regulatory state.33 In other words, a close examination of the documented
rural experience—in which the regulatory state is perceived as antithetical
to dignity, inclusion, and survival in one way or another—seems to
confirm some of the common concerns raised about the administrative
state’s legitimacy.
The Article’s second argument is that at least some objective
structural features of the regulatory state align with rural populations’ fears
and perceptions. Overall, the regulatory state has transformed dramatically
during the past several decades.34 Deregulation of certain economic sectors
in favor of greater private competition has contributed to geographic
divergence in regional prosperity.35 Meanwhile, the growth of other
aspects of the regulatory state has imposed new obligations on economic
activity with disparate significance for different regions. Commentary on
environmental law, for instance, is beginning to reckon with the fact that
environmental regulations actually can threaten livelihoods that are
primarily rural in nature and that these trade-offs should be taken
seriously.36
While the overall transformation of the regulatory state has yielded
unique, under-mitigated impacts in rural communities, regulatory
decisionmaking also bears unique problems for remote and isolated
regions. Administrative law scholarship has recognized substantial
barriers to public participation in agency rulemaking and land use
decisionmaking, which can be exacerbated by factors of geography and
socioeconomic inequality.37 Cost-benefit analysis—that central
component of the regulatory state’s decisionmaking that seeks to place a
monetary value on potential trade-offs and “declare a winner by adding up
the total dollar amounts on each side of the ledger”38—naturally
disadvantages rural workers and environmental justice communities
because their small numbers inevitably seem insignificant in processes
that emphasize aggregate welfare.39 These objective structural factors,
constitutionality, although relevant debates on that topic may also be implicated. See
discussion infra Part II. Thus, this inquiry could be considered one concerned with
“sociological legitimacy,” as opposed to “legal legitimacy.” Nicholas Bagley, The
Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 378–79 (2019) [hereinafter Bagley, Procedure
Fetish] (distinguishing between the two concepts).
33. See discussion infra Part II.
34. See discussion infra Part IV.
35. See generally Sitaraman et al., supra note 7 (discussing role of regulatory choices
in benefitting some geographic regions and harming others).
36. See discussion infra Part IV.
37. See discussion infra Part II.
38. See Heinzerling, supra note 19.
39. See infra Part IV.
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alongside literature on rural sentiments, again point toward a crisis of
legitimacy in the regulatory state’s relationship with rural populations—
and possibly others—for procedural and substantive reasons.
The Article concludes with possible pathways to address the
problems described here, with a view to making the regulatory state fairer
and more effective in general. Because crises of legitimacy stem from
conditions of structural exclusion and substantive arbitrariness that make
populations view government as generally unfair or unjust, these proposed
solutions utilize a justice lens to offer a way forward. Specifically, the
Article’s proposed solutions focus on the need for enhanced procedural,
distributive, and restorative justice within the regulatory state. These aims
are meaningful in their own right, but are also key to “connect[ing] the
legitimacy of the administrative state to its ability to satisfy public
aspirations: to enable a fairer distribution of wealth and political power; to
protect us from the predations of private corporations; and to minimize
risks to our health, financial security, and livelihoods.”40
Procedurally, enhanced bottom-up processes to inform agency
policies and localized decisions can help address democratic deficits in
rural (and other groups’) participation in the regulatory state—with a key
focus on incorporating flexibility that is often considered in tension with
systems of regulatory decisionmaking. Distributional equity can be
pursued through a renewed commitment to geographic considerations for
access to infrastructure, drawing on a reinvigorated approach to economic
regulation that emphasizes the public interest over private discretion in
service provision, as well as through a greater emphasis on geographic and
socioeconomic equality in agency decisionmaking.41 Restorative justice
may be achieved through establishing a centralized, coordinated federal
avenue to pursue a more comprehensive accounting for the past several
decades of poorly mitigated regulatory trade-offs and other harms to
welfare effectuated by federal policies in rural communities. Such an effort
should be coupled with the pursuit of important national policy goals like
facilitating sustainable, racially just agricultural and energy production.42
Ongoing developments at the federal level hold promise that some of these
measures may come to fruition.43

40. Bagley, Procedure Fetish, supra note 32, at 400.
41. See Ann M. Eisenberg, Economic Regulation and Rural America, 98 WASH. U.
L. REV. 737, 771 (2021); see also Sitaraman et al., supra note 7, at 1777; K. Sabeel Rahman,
The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public
Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1633–34 (2018).
42. See infra Part V.
43. See, e.g., Laura Reiley, Relief Bill Is Most Significant Legislation for Black
Farmers Since Civil Rights Act, Experts Say, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2021),
https://wapo.st/3KxOnMi.
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Critically, the solution to the problems described here is not to
weaken socially important regulations or dismantle the regulatory state
and its many necessary societal contributions.44 This Article is not an
extended argument against regulations. The solution, rather, is to enrich
our collective understanding of regulatory fairness and how it can best be
both incorporated into the regulatory state and felt by populations subject
to regulatory governance.45
Of course, it is far from clear that adjusting federal agencies’
decisionmaking processes is the key to defusing urban/rural polarization.
It is also not clear that adjusting decisionmaking processes to defuse rural
disaffection is the key to establishing the regulatory state’s legitimacy.
Yet, the following discussion illustrates that such steps are likely a
necessary-but-insufficient piece of these thorny societal problems. These
steps are also important for addressing the disaffection and suffering of
rural populations who are not associated with political polarization, yet
who remain marginalized by regulatory processes and priorities.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief introduction
to the basic structure of the federal regulatory state and scholarly
discussions and controversies surrounding it. Section III.A introduces
legitimacy theory and identifies three conditions scholars recognize as
giving rise to institutional legitimacy vis-à-vis a particular population, the
absence of which in turn undermines legitimacy: a population’s sense (1)
of procedural inclusion and fair treatment by the institution; (2) that the
institution’s outcomes are not arbitrary, unfair, or irrational; and (3) that
the institution is not merely another group wielding its power to the
detriment of that population. Part III.B synthesizes literature on diverse
rural communities’ views of the regulatory state and argues that common
themes of procedural exclusion and a sense of being disrespected,
dissatisfaction with outcomes, and a general “us-versus-them” perspective
point toward a crisis of legitimacy borne of problems that are also notably
consistent with scholarly critiques of the regulatory state.
Part IV argues that certain objective, structural features of the
regulatory state align with the literature on rural populations’ subjective
experiences, further buttressing the argument that the regulatory state is
facing a crisis of legitimacy in its relationship to rural communities.
Specifically, Part IV.A observes that issues of class, race, and geography
can indeed function as barriers to rural populations’ meaningful
participation in agency decisionmaking. Part IV.B shows how agency
44. See Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era,
119 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 393–94, 401–10 (2019) (noting agencies’ involvement in
monitoring wage theft, ensuring food safety, and protecting clean water).
45. Cf. Revesz, supra note 18, at 1506–08 (discussing the administrative state’s
struggles to incorporate questions of fairness and distributive factors).
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decisionmaking, by way of processes such as cost-benefit analysis, has
likely not adequately taken salient rural conditions into account, meaning
regulatory trade-offs felt by rural communities are probably more severe
than outside decisionmakers and commentators have recognized or
accounted for. Part IV.C explores the legal history of deregulation,
unearthing a story of rural legislators protesting rural communities’
structural exclusion from the regulatory state. The overall picture that
emerges is that over the past several decades, the regulatory state has
simultaneously abandoned, exploited, and encroached upon rural
communities in ways that would help explain the sentiments explored in
Part III.
Part V addresses avenues for enhancing the regulatory state’s
legitimacy through measures geared toward incorporating procedural,
distributive, and restorative justice. Part V.A argues that messier, more
human-centric processes are key to incorporating marginalized
communities’ voices in regulatory decisionmaking. Part V.B argues that
geographic equity and socioeconomic equality must become more central
concerns of the regulatory state. Part V.C suggests that a centralized
federal approach to addressing rural socioeconomic marginalization—
both the marginalization stemming from the regulatory state’s activities
and otherwise—may be a particularly effective avenue to counteracting
challenging regulatory trade-offs in rural communities.
II.

THE STRUCTURE OF AND CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING THE
REGULATORY STATE

This Part offers a brief summary of the regulatory state’s basic
structure and three of the main controversies surrounding the regulatory
state’s provenance, organization, and activities. These controversies
include the regulatory state’s constitutionality under separation of powers
principles, its avenues for public participation, and the decisionmaking
structures that guide agency conduct.
This discussion is meant to provide a simplified overview of a
complex and far-reaching body of literature and is not meant to be
comprehensive or analytical. Rather, this summary is provided to create a
frame of reference for the Article’s subsequent, more granular
investigation of rural populations’ experiences with the regulatory state in
Part III and the examination of how some of these controversies implicate
questions of geography and equity in Part IV. The discussion returns in
particular to the debates surrounding public participation and cost-benefit
analysis, while the constitutional questions are reviewed primarily to
illustrate the regulatory state’s highly politicized nature as an object of
public concern.
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A. A Basic Map of the Regulatory State
As the authors of a popular administrative law textbook explain,
“Modern government is administrative government.”46 That is, “[m]uch of
modern life is a product, in large part, of the activities of administrative
agencies.”47 Yet, the ubiquity of administrative government does not make
it uncontroversial.48 Rather, “administrative law doctrine is closely
entangled with high-level political disputes about the actual and
appropriate role of government.”49
The first federal agencies in the United States were executive
agencies created under the purview of the executive branch and run by the
president’s cabinet officials.50 Up until the late nineteenth century, the role
of these agencies in regulating societal activities was relatively modest.51
The passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) in 1887 created the
first congressional or “independent” federal agency, known as the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).52 The ICC was primarily created
to regulate the railroad industry so that the industry would not discriminate
against less geographically desirable regions.53 The ICA provided that the
ICC’s commissioners would be appointed by the president with the advice
and consent of the Senate.54 Although the president had the power to
remove ICC commissioners, the agency was designed to have some
independence from the executive branch and political parties.55

46. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 1 (6th ed. 2006).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 13.
49. Id.; see also David B. Spence, Regulating Competition, Both the Forest and the
Trees, 70 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 13, 15 (2021) (“At the heart of the ideological conflict
between the American political parties lies a fundamental disagreement about regulation
and the proper relationship between government and markets.”).
50. See BREYER, supra note 46, at 15.
51. Sophia Z. Lee, Our Administered Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism
from the Founding to the Present, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1699, 1719 (2019) (noting the Civil
War as a turning point after which administrative state expanded notably, in part through
congressional creation of new agencies).
52. See Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383
(1887) [hereinafter ICA]. It did so subsequent to Supreme Court decisions including Munn
v. Illinois, which upheld the government’s power to regulate private industries. See Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135–36 (1876).
53. See BREYER, supra note 46, at 16.
54. See ICA § 11.
55. Over the subsequent several decades, the ICC’s jurisdiction expanded from
oversight of the railroad industry to regulate most forms of commercial transportation. See
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1359 (1998).
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Today, executive agencies and independent agencies retain some
differences but share many commonalities.56 Although the defining line
between the two types of agencies is not always clear,57 “[g]enerally
speaking, executive agencies are subject to direct presidential control,
while independent agencies are typically designed by statute to be
comparatively free from presidential control.”58 Prominent examples of
executive agencies include: the U.S. Department of Agriculture (which
includes the Forest Service), Department of Energy, Department of the
Interior (which includes the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land
Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Parks Service),
Department of Labor, and Department of Transportation.59 Prominent
examples of independent agencies include: the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Farm Credit Administration, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Postal Service, Federal Communications Commission,
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, and Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau.60
Variations among them notwithstanding, federal agencies engage in
similar processes and are subject to consistent requirements. Agencies’
most significant activity is arguably the promulgation of rules, which have
the effect of law, and which are created in order to implement statutes
passed by Congress.61 To promulgate rules, agencies must comply with
the mandates of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA).62
Although most agencies have an organic statute establishing them and

56. See Kadie Martin, So Much to Comment on, So Little Time: Notice-and-Comment
Requirements in Agency Informal Rulemaking Under the Administrative Procedure Act,
61 B.C.L. REV. E.SUPP. II.-132, II.-132 (2020), https://bit.ly/3tIpS7m (discussing universal
requirements for federal agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act); Katherine A.
Trisolini, Decisions, Disasters, and Deference: Rethinking Agency Expertise After
Fukushima, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 323, 330 (2015) (discussing procedures and norms
common across agencies, notwithstanding agency differences); Neomi Rao, Removal:
Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205, 1208 (2014)
(explaining that all agencies are technically part of the executive branch, whether they are
understood as independent or executive).
57. See id. at 1208, 1209 (arguing that political factors decide agency independence
more than any bright-line definition).
58. JARED P. COLE & DANIEL T. SHEDD, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43562,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRIMER: STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF “AGENCY” AND
CHARACTERISTICS OF AGENCY INDEPENDENCE 1 (2014), https://bit.ly/3u2xO57; see also
Rao, supra note 56, at 1207.
59. See Newspaper & Current Periodical Reading Room, LIBR. OF CONG.,
https://bit.ly/3rV47R2 (last visited Feb. 14, 2022); Bureaus & Offices, U.S. DEP’T
INTERIOR, https://on.doi.gov/3H0DY9E (last visited Feb. 14, 2022).
60. See LIBR. OF CONG., supra note 59.
61. See COLE & SHEDD, supra note 58.
62. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–504, 553; see also Christopher J. Walker, The Lost World of
the Administrative Procedure Act: A Literature Review, 28 GEO. MASON L. REV. 733, 733
(2021) (describing the APA as “the quasi-constitution of the modern administrative state”).
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outlining their powers and responsibilities, “the APA provides the
‘default’ procedures that agencies must follow when conducting
rulemaking and adjudications.”63 In addition to the APA, other federal
statutes and executive orders direct all agencies to take common actions,
including the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),64 the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),65 President Clinton’s Executive Order
12898 on Environmental Justice,66 and President Biden’s more recent
Executive Order on Advancing Racial Equity and Support for
Underserved Communities.67 Federal agencies also manage roughly 606.5
million acres of public land.68
Courts also play a substantial role in the regulatory state. The APA
establishes the standards for judicial review of agencies’ decisions.69 The
Supreme Court in turn has crafted a body of law articulating standards for
courts’ review of agency actions. Centrally, the 1984 Supreme Court
decision of Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., established the standard by which a court reviewing an agency’s
action defers to the agency’s construction of its organic statute.70 Courts
provide a substantial check on agency power, and agencies may conduct
their activities with a view to potential challenges of their conduct in court.
In sum, the federal regulatory state can be understood as a complex
ecosystem involving executive and congressional mandates of power to
agencies to carry out public initiatives, executive implementation of
agency mandates, and judicial review of agency activities. Agencies’
activities are diverse and far-ranging, affecting the public in a variety of
ways through rulemaking, adjudication of disputes, land management, and
other discretionary conduct. The question of how power is allocated—
across the three federal branches, within agencies themselves, between
agencies and the public, and among stakeholders who engage with
agencies—largely shapes the most charged controversies surrounding the
regulatory state, as discussed below.

63. COLE & SHEDD, supra note 58, at 8.
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2009).
65. 54 U.S.C. § 100101; National Park Service and Related Programs, Pub. L. No.
113-287, 128 Stat. 3094 (2014).
66. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
67. Exec. Order No. 13,985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7009 (Jan. 20, 2021).
68. See CAROL HARDY VINCENT ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND
OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 1 (2020), https://bit.ly/33YM2sT.
69. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2000).
70. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984).
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B. Controversies Surrounding the Regulatory State
A robust body of literature explores the myriad controversies
surrounding the regulatory state. This Section briefly describes three
among the most prominent of those controversies: (1) the highly
politicized question of the regulatory state’s constitutionality; (2) the
public’s ability to hold the regulatory state accountable through
participation in agency processes; and (3) cost-benefit analysis as a way to
assess particular regulations’ potential downsides and benefits before the
regulations’ promulgation.
1. Politics and the Regulatory State’s Constitutional Pedigree
The advent and growth of the regulatory state have been the subjects
of debate since the beginning. Many law schools’ administrative law
courses are designed around what is often considered the fundamental
question bedeviling federal agencies: Is this system of governance actually
consistent with the U.S. Constitution? Jody Freeman wrote twenty years
ago,
Agencies can claim, after all, only a dubious constitutional lineage . . .
. The combination of executive, legislative, and adjudicative functions
in administrative agencies appears to violate the separation of powers
principles embodied in the Constitution. Worse yet, despite their
considerable discretionary power to impact individual liberty and
property rights, allocate benefits and burdens, and shape virtually
every sector of the economy, agencies are not directly accountable to
the electorate.71

The nondelegation doctrine is often at the heart of the debate over
federal agencies’ constitutionality. The U.S. Constitution provides that
“[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States.”72 Nicholas Parrillo explains, “[s]ince the nineteenth
century, the Supreme Court has construed this language to mean Congress
cannot give away its legislative powers: there is a constitutional limit on
how much power Congress can delegate by statute to the President or to
administrators in the Executive branch.”73 Courts will therefore strike

71. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
545–46 (2000).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
73. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against
Administrative Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the Federal Tax on Private Real
Estate in the 1790s, 130 YALE L.J. 1288, 1293 (2021) [hereinafter Parrillo, Critical
Assessment of the Originalist Case] (citing Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 681–94 (1892)).
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down congressional delegations of power that appear overly broad.74
However, as courts have done so in only three instances to date, the
nondelegation doctrine has not been considered a particularly strong
mandate.75
Ideologically, many have disagreed with the Court’s weak
enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine. Sides in debates over the
regulatory state’s constitutionality often align with conservative and
liberal political views.76 Conservative Supreme Court justices decry
agencies as unconstitutional and over-reaching.77 Unsurprisingly, this
view is associated with a strong commitment to a firmer nondelegation
doctrine.78
The liberal view, meanwhile, is associated with concerns that
agencies are “insufficiently zealous” in pursuing their regulatory mandates
and with robust defenses of the regulatory state’s constitutional basis.79
Scholars now anticipate that today’s highly conservative Supreme Court
is likely to revisit the nondelegation doctrine with a view to weakening
agencies’ power.80 Such a development has concerning implications for
pressing public matters such as climate change, which require swift and
aggressive action that many agree agencies are best positioned to pursue.
Conservative judges and scholars have attacked the regulatory state’s
constitutional legitimacy on other grounds. For instance, Chevron has
been criticized as an improper transfer of judicial authority to interpret law
to agencies themselves, supposedly violating, as with the nondelegation
doctrine, principles of the separation of powers.81 Critics have otherwise
argued that courts’ deference to agency interpretations of law, procedure,
and factfinding violates various constitutional provisions or norms.82

74. See id.; J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)
(holding that statutes will be upheld if they provide “intelligible principle” to those
implementing the law).
75. See Parrillo, Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case, supra note 73, at 1293.
76. See, e.g., Bagley, Procedure Fetish, supra note 32, at 346 (describing
congressional Republicans’ proposals to “discipline a regulatory state that, in their view,
does too much and with too little care”).
77. Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under
Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17–24, 71 (2017).
78. Id.
79. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613,1618 (2019); Julian Davis
Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 277
(2021) (arguing that the Constitution was not originally understood to contain a
nondelegation doctrine).
80. See Parrillo, Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case, supra note 73, at 1294.
81. See Sunstein, supra note 79, at 1678–79 (rejecting criticisms of Chevron as
unjustified transfer of authority to agencies); Craig Green, Chevron Debates and the
Constitutional Transformation of Administrative Law, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 654 (2020).
82. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV.
852, 873 (2020).
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Certainly, politics are not always the motivating factor behind
debates over the regulatory state. Scholars and judges of all backgrounds
have tackled concerns such as the risk of agency capture, questions about
efficiency and consumer welfare, and the appropriate balance of
bureaucratic expertise versus competing factors, such as public
participation.83 Nonetheless, this context helps explain, in part, why rural
antipathy toward the regulatory state might be dismissed as another
example of politics as usual. The size, legitimacy, and efficacy of the
regulatory state are common political flashpoints at the highest levels of
national politics. A stance for or against the regulatory state evokes this
charged, national political controversy. Part III explores how a more
nuanced analysis of rural views reveals that they are more than an
outgrowth of this ideological battle over the size and nature of the federal
government.
2. Public Participation and Democratic Accountability
Across agencies, public participation in agency processes takes place
most commonly during agency policymaking and through direct
collaboration with agencies managing land. Public participation in
policymaking usually takes the form of notice-and-comment rulemaking
mandated by section 553(c) of the APA.84 Under this process, an agency
must announce a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), then offer the
public the opportunity to provide comments on the proposed rule.85
Agencies regularly receive thousands of comments when they issue a
NPRM, which are often submitted online through a portal at
regulations.gov. Agencies are also required to “adequately explain new

83. See generally Sharon B. Jacobs, Agency Genesis and the Energy Transition, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 835 (2021) (articulating potential risks and benefits of creating new
agencies); Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Wishnick, Technocratic Pragmatism,
Bureaucratic Expertise, and the Federal Reserve, 130 YALE L.J. 636 (2021) (examining
tension between expansion of agency powers to fight important problems versus concerns
about agency accountability); Shannon Roesler, Agency Reasons at the Intersection of
Expertise and Presidential Preferences, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 491 (2019) (examining tension
between model preferencing presidential control over agencies versus model prioritizing
agencies as bureaucratic experts); Kenta Tsuda, Making Bureaucracies Think
Distributively: Reforming the Administrative State with Action-Forcing Distributional
Review, 7 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 131 (2017) (arguing that agencies should be forced
to consider distributional impacts of major regulatory actions to address the regulatory state
legitimacy problem); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010) (articulating need for effective institutional
design to insulate agencies from interest group pressures).
84. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
85. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3).
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regulations to the public,” which they do in the Code of Federal
Regulations.86
Public participation in policymaking is largely geared toward making
policies’ substance informed and transparent.87 As Jonathan Choi
explains, “These procedures play a key role in administrative law—they
are thought to increase public engagement, democratic accountability,
agency legitimacy, the diversity of views in the regulatory process, and the
quality of the regulation ultimately produced.”88 Public participation can
also have downsides, as it is time-consuming, costly, and may delay the
implementation of important measures.89
Agencies’ direct collaboration with the public may come in the form
of consultation on land use planning, public lands management, or project
siting.90 For instance, local stakeholders are involved in the creation of
NEPA’s requisite environmental impact statement, the NHPA’s
consultation with Native American tribes for culturally or religiously
significant sites, and Executive Order 12898’s requirement for agencies to
take environmental justice concerns into account to the greatest extent
possible.91
Both avenues for public participation have been objects of regular
criticism. Concerning rulemaking, Sant’Ambrogio and Staszewski
observe,
86. See Jonathan H. Choi, Legal Analysis, Policy Analysis, and the Price of
Deference: An Empirical Study of Mayo and Chevron, 38 YALE J. REGUL. 818, 821 (2021).
87. See Choi, supra note 86, at 821–22; cf. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Should the Public
Get to Participate Before Federal Agencies Issue Guidance? An Empirical Study, 71
ADMIN. L. REV. 57, 58 (2019) [hereinafter Parrillo, Should the Public Get to Participate]
(querying whether the public should be entitled to participate in agencies’ issuance of
informal guidance for similar reasons).
88. Choi, supra note 86, at 821–22.
89. Cary Coglianese et al., Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal
Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 924, 928–29 (2009).
90. Mark Squillace, Rethinking Public Land Use Planning, 43 HARV. ENV’T L. REV.
415, 426–32 (2019) (detailing public participation procedures in land use planning used by
Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management and role of National Environmental Policy
Act); Michael C. Blumm & Olivier Jamin, The Trump Public Lands Revolution:
Redefining “The Public” in Public Land Law, 48 ENV’T L. 311, 363 (2018) (noting
National Environmental Policy Act role as providing public opportunities to participate in
decisionmaking affecting public land and resources); David A. Lewis, Identifying and
Avoiding Conflicts Between Historic Preservation and the Development of Renewable
Energy, 22 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 274, 303 (2015) (describing National Historic Preservation
Act requirement that federal agencies consult with the public on federal undertakings on
historic resources). Another public-facing component of the regulatory state is the
important, but under-appreciated, role of regulatory monitors in their capacity as enforcers
of civil law. See Van Loo, supra note 44, at 378.
91. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); 54 U.S.C. § 302706(b);
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
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Although formally quite open and democratic, in practice wellorganized groups of sophisticated stakeholders often dominate public
participation in notice and comment . . . . Typically absent, however,
are most regulatory beneficiaries, smaller regulated entities, state,
local, and tribal governments, unaffiliated experts, stakeholders with
situated knowledge of the regulatory issues, and the general public.92

Scholars have called for broadening and facilitating even more robust
and meaningful public participation in rulemaking, though efforts to date
have encountered a variety of barriers.93
Similar critiques shape the conversation on stakeholders’ direct
collaboration with federal agencies. Federal land management and
planning initiatives often encounter local opposition and complaints about
federal procedures.94 For instance, local government officials have
reported finding federal policies too complex and laden with jargon to
navigate.95 Federal-local collaboration is often perceived as perfunctory,
with the public lacking meaningful opportunities to influence the
outcomes of decisions that affect them.96 These themes are explored in
more depth in Part III.
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Criticism of the regulatory state grew in the 1970s and ‘80s. A central
argument advanced during this period, which gained particular traction
during the “Reagan Revolution” of deregulation in the 1980s, was that
excessive regulation needlessly and inefficiently infringed markets to the
detriment of businesses and consumers.97 Thus, during this period,
measures to slow down or require extra checks on new regulations found
a place in the administrative law decisionmaking apparatus.98
92. Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Glen Staszewski, Democratizing Rule Development,
98 WASH. U. L. REV. 793, 797 (2021).
93. See, e.g., Julie Moroney, Reviving Negotiated Rulemaking for an Accessible
Internet, 119 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1603 (2021) (detailing the rise of negotiated rulemaking
and its decline due to agency skepticism of benefits, costliness, and political disputes); see
generally Coglianese et al., supra note 89 (noting widespread recognition of need to
improve the agency rulemaking process, especially in regard to transparency and public
participation).
94. See generally Squillace, supra note 90 (arguing that land use planning on public
lands is “broken”).
95. See Bryan et al., Cause for Rebellion? Examining how Federal Land
Management Agencies & Local Governments Collaborate on Land Use Planning, 6 J.
ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 1, 14 (2015).Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.
96. See id.
97. William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic
Regulation in America, 35 YALE J. REG. 721, 771 (2018).
98. See id.; Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation
of Civil Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1204
(2012).
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In 1978, President Carter’s Executive Order 12,044 “established
procedures for analyzing the impact of new regulations and minimizing
their burdens.”99 Two years later, the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980
created the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the
Office of Management and Budget, the mandate of which was to review
and approve all new reporting requirements.100 The following year saw the
birth of cost-benefit analysis with President Reagan’s Executive Order
12,291, which directed OIRA to ensure that any draft regulation’s benefits
exceeded its costs.101 President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866 of 1993
modified cost-benefit analysis somewhat, but “retained OIRA’s review of
significant new regulations” through cost-benefit analysis.102
Today, OIRA’s use of cost-benefit analysis continues. Cost-benefit
analysis involves comparing “the benefits for the public with the costs of
complying with the regulation.”103 Although cost-benefit analysis appears
to provide a quantitative, rational foothold to guide the passage of new
regulations, like the issues described above, this mode of decisionmaking
has been subject to scrutiny and controversy. Key questions surrounding
cost-benefit analysis include what factors count as costs or benefits, how
they should be weighed against one another, how seemingly
unquantifiable factors can be quantified, and what the implications of these
calculations ought to be.104
“Defenders of cost-benefit analysis extol it as a pillar—if not the
foundation—of rational governance.”105 Yet, throughout the past several
decades, critiques of cost-benefit analysis have often been fierce.106 Many
find the idea of cost-benefit analysis repugnant in light of its insistence on
monetizing things that are arguably priceless. One commentator
characterizes cost-benefit analysis as risking “represent[ing] the conceit of
a technocratic elite imposing its own vision of the good on the rest of
99. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12661 (Mar. 23, 1978) repealed by Exec.
Order No. 12,291, 43 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 17, 1981); see Susan Dudley, A Brief History
of Regulation and Deregulation, REGUL. REV. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://bit.ly/3Mx31UY.
100. See Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812
(1980); see Dudley, supra note 99.
101. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 17, 1981); see Revesz,
supra note 18, at 1491.
102. Dudley, supra note 99; Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30,
1993).
103. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and CostBenefit Analysis, 98 VA. L. REV. 579, 580 (2012).
104. See Benjamin Minhao Chen, The Expressiveness of Regulatory Trade-Offs, 55
GA. L. REV. 1029, 1032–33 (2020) (critiquing agencies’ assigned monetary values for
avoiding death from cancer and rape in prison as having underlying premises that health
interests of cancer victims and avoiding rape “could become too pricey to avert”).
105. Id. at 1033.
106. See Ori Sharon, Finding Eden in A Cost-Benefit State, 27 GEO. MASON L. REV.
571, 572 (2020) (describing criticisms of cost-benefit analysis).
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society.”107 He posits, “To the extent that agencies are formulating policies
and making rules based on an analysis that many citizens reject, they—
and their decisions—suffer from a legitimacy deficit, a state of affairs that
might undermine trust in the administrative state.”108 Livermore and
Revesz argue that cost-benefit analysis is flawed, but at the very least
worth salvaging as the best hope for critical needs like climate reform.109
This theme is explored in more depth in Part IV.
To conclude this Part, the regulatory state’s legitimacy (constitutional
and otherwise) and effectiveness have been lauded and attacked on several
fronts in ways that often overlap with commentators’ political leanings.
Delegation and deference, public participation, and cost-benefit analysis
are all particular flashpoints for controversy surrounding federal agencies
and their many activities. As the subsequent Parts will show, several of
these themes arise in rural populations’ perceptions of, and experiences
with, the regulatory state. This unique but important story adds additional
wrinkles to the ongoing saga of the role of the regulatory state in American
life.
III. RURAL VIEWS OF THE REGULATORY STATE AS A SYMPTOM OF
LEGITIMACY PROBLEMS
This Part uses the lens of legitimacy theory to articulate a novel
analysis of rural perceptions of the regulatory state and shed light on those
perceptions’ significance. Section III.A provides an overview of
legitimacy theory as a useful lens through which to assess particular
populations’ relationships with government. Part III.B then applies aspects
of legitimacy theory to a broad body of literature on rural communities’
sentiments toward federal regulations and agencies, observes the
commonalities between this literature and administrative law’s key
controversies, and argues that subjective rural accounts seem symptomatic
of broader problems of legitimacy within the regulatory state.
A. Legitimacy Theory as a Lens to Assess Populations’
Relationships with Government
Commentary on the controversies surrounding the administrative
state often refers to problems with, and concerns about, its legitimacy, as
illustrated above. But “legitimacy” can mean many things; administrative
law scholars invoke it, often without defining it, to refer to questions
107. Chen, supra note 104, at 1035.
108. Id.
109. See generally MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE & RICHARD REVESZ, REVIVING
RATIONALITY: SAVING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR THE SAKE OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND
OUR HEALTH (Oxford Univ. Press 2020) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis can and should
be salvaged to create effective policy and restore faith in government).
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concerning constitutional authority, procedural processes, and democratic
accountability.110 As such, a brief overview of aspects of legitimacy theory
is warranted before an exploration of how this lens relates to rural
perceptions of the regulatory state. As with the administrative law
controversies described above, this discussion is not meant to debate the
contours of legitimacy theory, so much as to establish some commonly
accepted features of legitimacy to serve as a frame of reference in the
subsequent discussion.
Understood broadly, legitimacy theory turns on questions of
populations’ acceptance of, and compliance with, government.111 The idea
of legitimacy is premised on the assumption that people subject to laws
and governance are invariably not going to be happy with every decision
that government makes. The crux of legitimacy, though, is that even where
governed populations are dissatisfied or disagree with governmental
decisions, if the institution, law, or decision in question is perceived as
legitimate, people will accept and comply with outcomes based on their
trust of, and deference to, the relevant institutions—and not merely
because of the threat of force or other form of coercion.112 A particular
governing body has a strong incentive for itself or its decisions to be
perceived as legitimate because ensuring compliance by force or coercion
is substantially more costly than when a population tends to comply
voluntarily.113
Binding decisions, laws, institutions, and governments perceived as
illegitimate will encounter resentment, resistance, and outright
disobedience. A state of illegitimacy gives rise to the phenomenon
observed in sociology literature known as anomie, or the state where law
and government leave populations “to see themselves . . . subject only to
the brute force of the state while excluded from its protection.”114 A
population’s state of normlessness, anomie, and legal cynicism all denote
some form of alienation from government and society. Monica Bell
explains these phenomena as about “more than distrust,” but rather, “a
sense that the very fabric of the social world is in chaos—a sense of social
estrangement, meaninglessness, and powerlessness, often as a result of

110. Cf. Hammond & Markell, supra note 23, at 320 (observing that “there is little
literature on how to measure agency legitimacy in the absence of” judicial review).
111. See Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation,
57 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 375, 376 (2006) [hereinafter Tyler, Psychological Perspectives]; see
also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 112 (2006).
112. See Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note 111, at 376.
113. See id.; cf. Morrow, Environmental Front, supra note 4, at 195–96 (observing
that New Mexico ranchers are unwilling to cooperate with federal agencies and question
agencies’ credibility and authority, while FWS is also unable to enforce ESA regulations
by coercion).
114. Bell, supra note 7, at 2057.
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structural instability and social change.”115 Rather than being a cultural
issue, “[i]t is a sense founded on legal and institutional exclusion and
liminality.”116 Bell contrasts this condition with law that is “well designed
and properly enforced,” which serves to “reassure community members
that society has not abandoned them, that they are engaged in a collective
project of making the social world.”117
Scholarly conversations on legitimacy tend to converge around key
conditions that give rise to a particular law or institution’s legitimacy or
lack thereof. Taking the liberty of simplifying a complex area for purposes
of discussion, the following analysis focuses on three of the conditions
commonly understood to give rise to legitimacy: (1) a population’s sense
of procedural inclusion, respect, and fair treatment; (2) a sense that even
if outcomes are not favorable, they are nonetheless rational, reasonable, or
at least not arbitrary; and (3) for a particular community or group, a sense
that the institution or law serves them in addition to other members of
society; or in other words, the presence of a non-antagonistic relationship
and the absence of a sense that the institution or law in question is merely
a locus of power for another group’s interests.
1. Procedural Inclusion, Respect, and Fair Treatment
An individual or group that is the object of an institution’s
governance is more likely to accept that governance as legitimate if they
accept the fairness of procedures that influence decisions that affect
them.118 This aspect of legitimacy is a central component of procedural
justice literature.119 People’s experiences of procedural fairness are
associated with the common facets of inclusive, democratic processes,
including opportunities to be heard (sometimes called “voice”) and
transparency in decisionmaking.120

115. Id. at 2084. This discussion draws on Bell’s writing to articulate conditions of
legitimacy, but it is worth noting that she situates her theory of “legal estrangement” as
distinct from, or advancing, literature on legitimacy theory, adding a focus on collective
experiences and social/structural inclusion as opposed to legitimacy literature’s traditional
emphases on individual experiences, distrust, and noncompliance with the law. See id. at
2089–90.
116. Id. at 2084–85.
117. Id. at 2085.
118. See Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note 111, at 378 (discussing the
work of John Thibaut).
119. See, e.g., Justin Sevier, A [Relational] Theory of Procedure, 104 MINN. L. REV.
1987 (2020).
120. See Victor D. Quintanilla, Human-Centered Civil Justice Design, 121 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 745, 766 (2017); see also Hammond & Markell, supra note 23, at 359–62
(discussing the importance of timeliness, transparency, access, and measurability in
establishing agency legitimacy).
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Whether or not an opportunity to voice concerns is meaningful or
perfunctory—i.e., whether an individual or group has the opportunity to
actually influence an outcome—can also inform the sense of fairness and
in turn, legitimacy.121 A perception of neutrality, impartiality, and the
consistent application of processes among decisionmakers can be key to
perceptions of fairness as well.122 In the context of the administrative state,
Hammond and Markell have observed that judicial review of agency
activities, although not always available, “is considered a critical
legitimizer” by providing a third party’s review of agency actions as well
as eliciting and articulating additional information explaining agencies’
decisions.123
Both positive and negative experiences of procedure can also be
subtler than formal processes and have more quotidian flavors. For
instance, even perceptions that government actors have behaved
disrespectfully “feed[] into an overall disbelief in the legitimacy of the
law.”124 How government actors treat individuals and groups “affects
feelings of standing, self-worth, and beliefs about one’s social identity and
whether the social groups to which one belongs are valued.”125 In that vein,
institutions’ failures to treat people with dignity and respect or to
acknowledge their concerns and identities can give rise to a sense of
procedural exclusion and unfairness.126
2. A Sense that Outcomes Are Fair, Reasonable, Rational, or at
Least Not Arbitrary
A second component of legitimacy is the perception by the governed
that outcomes are not arbitrary or that outcomes are otherwise informed
by rational factors. This component relates to the first: undesirable
outcomes are more likely to be perceived as fair if the processes that
produced them were perceived as fair.127 However, it is possible for
institutions and their procedures to be perceived as legitimate, while the
governed still question “the fairness, validity, or appropriateness of the
121. See Quintanilla, supra note 120, at 767; see also Robert J. MacCoun, Voice,
Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 175 (2005) (distinguishing between “decision control” and “process
control” and noting that the body of literature on process control has received much more
attention in literature).
122. See Quintanilla, supra note 120, at 767.
123. See Hammond & Markell, supra note 23, at 314.
124. Bell, supra note 7, at 2100.
125. Quintanilla, supra note 120, at 764.
126. See Bell, supra note 7, at 2100 (quoting Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice,
Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 350 (2003)); see also
Quintanilla, supra note 120, at 766 (describing procedural justice as including components
of procedural fairness and treatment fairness).
127. See Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note 111, at 378.
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laws or regulations that an authority is enforcing.”128 In other words,
legitimacy may turn on “whether or not one agrees with the values that are
supposed to be implemented and complied with.”129 A perception that
rules being enforced are reasonable, appropriate, or fair in turn fuels
perceptions of legitimacy.130
Social science and administrative law literature has historically been
somewhat dismissive of the role of outcomes and the opportunity to
actually influence decisions in perceptions of fairness and legitimacy.131
This is largely because of the critical role fair procedures play in
populations’ acceptance of outcomes, whether those outcomes are
favorable or not.132 Some studies have indeed shown that the ability to
control decisions matters substantially less than the ability to simply voice
concerns.133
Nonetheless, scholars have observed the importance of substantive
outcomes to perceptions of legitimacy, in addition to this factor’s
significance simply being quite intuitive. Hammond and Markell observe,
“[M]ost scholars acknowledge that the distributive consequences of a
process also are important to assessments of the legitimacy of that
process.”134 In other words, “if change seems unobtainable,” it undermines
the perception of procedural fairness, and “a process may be viewed as
arbitrary or useless, undermining its overall legitimacy.”135 Nicholas
Bagley has noted that, in fact, “procedures can also undermine legitimacy
and frustrate accountability” when designed solely for procedure’s sake.136
Thus, some attention to actual outcomes and the distributional effects of
decisions—attention that is surely paid by those affected by the
decisions—is warranted in an assessment of legitimacy.

128. Kristina Murphy et al., Nurturing Regulatory Compliance: Is Procedural Justice
Effective When People Question the Legitimacy of the Law?, 3 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE,
no. 1, Mar. 2009, at 3.
129. Id. at 19.
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation:
What’s Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 787, 818 n.150, 826 n.190 (2001).
132. Cf. Bagley, Procedure Fetish, supra note 32, at 369 (criticizing administrative
law’s embrace of proceduralism as a sign of reluctance to grapple with the trade-offs that
administrative law inevitably entails).
133. See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 131, at 818 n.150, 826 n.190.
134. Hammond & Markell, supra note 23, at 329 (citing Tom R. Tyler & Gregory
Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United
States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 790–91 (1993–1994)).
135. Hammond & Markell, supra note 23, at 330.
136. Bagley, Procedure Fetish, supra note 32, at 369.
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3. A Sense of a Non-Antagonistic Relationship and that the
Law/Institution is Not Merely Another Group Wielding Its
Power in an Exclusive Manner
A third component of legitimacy may be understood as a more or less
amicable or tolerant collective or community-level relationship with the
institution or law in question. This component, too, interacts with the two
conditions discussed above. Procedural exclusion, unfair treatment, and
unfavorable substantive outcomes have a signaling effect, communicating
to excluded groups that they are unworthy of protection—which implies
that someone else, whoever is included, is more worthy of that
protection.137
If a population believes that an institution serves someone other than
them, the institution is perceived as a threat more broadly than by the
specifics of its unfair processes or outcomes. Legitimacy literature has
often emphasized that individuals tend to draw conclusions about laws or
institutions from their own personal experiences. However, other people’s
negative experiences can also “feed into a more general, cultural sense of
alienation,” making perceptions of illegitimacy emerge from “the
cumulative, collective experience of procedural and substantive
injustice.”138 Communities may hold a “collective memory” of
interactions with government actors, or a “cultural conception of what it is
like to interact” with government actors “that emanates in part from
membership in a group or identity category.”139
This sense of collective alienation may relate to a sense that neutralseeming laws in fact have negative, differing experiences for the group in
question.140 Bell links this idea to “legal closure,” or the phenomenon of
law becoming “a means of hoarding legal resources for the socially and
socioeconomically advantaged while locking marginalized groups out of
the benefits of” governance, thereby leaving some areas “essentially
lawless”—over-scrutinized, yet under-protected—“while others may be
rigorously defended over and above the degree to which they are at

137. See Quintanilla, supra note 120, at 765; Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71
VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1288 (2018) (citing Bell, supra note 7).
138. Bell, supra note 7, at 2105; see also Faith E. Gifford, Michael D. Reisig, A
Multidimensional Model of Legal Cynicism, 43 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 383, 384 (2019)
(noting the importance of vicarious experiences and accounts in individuals’ development
of legal cynicism that fuels perceptions of low legitimacy); Margaret B. Kwoka, Leaking
and Legitimacy, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1387, 1421 (2015) (noting the importance of
vicarious experiences in forming beliefs about legitimacy).
139. See Bell, supra note 7, at 2106.
140. See id. at 2115.
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risk.”141 The legal closure concept helps capture the fact “that there are
both losers and winners” in the ways certain institutions are run.142
If these conditions—procedural injustice, perceptions of arbitrary
substantive outcomes, and a sense of collective exclusion and
antagonism—are all present, they create a recipe to “effectively banish
whole communities from the body politic.”143 The next Section turns to
the question of how rural populations’ perceptions of the regulatory state
interact with these aspects of legitimacy theory.
B. Rural Perceptions of the Regulatory State as a Crisis of
Legitimacy
This discussion applies the legitimacy framework established above
to the question of rural communities’ relationships with the regulatory
state, proceeding through each of the conditions described above in turn.
The discussion concludes that rural communities’ disaffection with the
regulatory state closely mirrors the conditions giving rise to legitimacy
problems, which are also strikingly consistent with the controversies
surrounding the regulatory state discussed in Part II.
Methodologically, the following analysis reflects an attempt at a farreaching, novel synthesis of modern socio-legal literature on rural
perceptions of the regulatory state. Although some works were
undoubtedly missed, the subsequent discussion involved: (1) a review of
prominent works of sociology144 and rural sociology,145 drawing out any
mentions of perceptions of federal agencies; (2) a review of literature on
Westlaw based on key word searches for mentions of perceptions of the
regulatory state among rural populations, with a focus on including rural
populations of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds; and (3) additional
searches in online databases for literature discussing rural sentiments
toward federal agencies and their activities.
Several caveats temper this discussion. First, while the following
discussion emphasizes the regulatory state’s role in rural disaffection, the
literature on rural sentiments places a parallel, undeniable emphasis on the
141. Id. at 2114–15.
142. See id.
143. See Swan, supra note 137, at 1288 (citing Bell, supra note 7).
144. These include HOCHSCHILD, supra note 3; CRAMER, supra note 2; WUTHNOW,
supra note 3; STEPHANIE A. MALIN, THE PRICE OF NUCLEAR POWER: URANIUM
COMMUNITIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (Rutgers Univ. Press 2015); and JILL LINDSEY
HARRISON, PESTICIDE DRIFT AND THE PURSUIT OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (MIT Press
2011).
145. These include JENNIFER SHERMAN, THOSE WHO WORK, THOSE WHO DON’T:
POVERTY, MORALITY, AND FAMILY IN RURAL AMERICA (Univ. of Minnesota Press 2009)
[hereinafter SHERMAN, THOSE WHO WORK]; JENNIFER SHERMAN, DIVIDING PARADISE:
RURAL INEQUALITY AND THE DIMINISHING AMERICAN DREAM 19 (2021) [hereinafter
SHERMAN, DIVIDING PARADISE]; and ASHWOOD, supra note 13.
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role of television and social media in influencing at least some rural views.
Influences such as right-wing news outlets and Facebook conspiracy
theorists are playing a clear role in shaping fear and antigovernment
sentiment among rural, conservative, and white populations in general.
However, the literature also acknowledges that these influences seeking to
foment and exploit this fear and alienation are not planting the seeds of
this alienation themselves, but taking advantage of seeds that were already
planted.146
The second caveat is that the average person’s understanding of how
government works is not necessarily the most specific, nuanced, detailed,
or even accurate.147 One would be hard-pressed to find rural residents who
would blame the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 for their
hometown’s struggles. Studies of rural perceptions of concrete aspects of
the regulatory state are scarce. Thus, the following discussion uses an
interpretive lens to filter the language of laypeople through the broader
legal and institutional context they may be alluding to, even if indirectly.
Objective structural features of the regulatory state are explored in Part IV
in order to complement this discussion of subjective views.
Third, it is difficult to generalize about rural communities and their
sentiments. As commentary on this topic repeatedly emphasizes, rural
America is not monolithic. This discussion has intentionally sought out a
variety of rural stories. But it does seem worth attempting to
conscientiously reconcile current rural challenges into a cohesive narrative
in light of unique rural conditions alongside today’s societal befuddlement
by those conditions.148 The following represents a synthesis of qualitative,
anecdotal data in order to unearth common themes that emerge across the
diverse landscapes, economies, and populations outside the urban centers

146. Cf. SHERMAN, DIVIDING PARADISE, supra note 145, at 19 (“Building upon
themes that were widespread in the mainstream media, old-timers were able to relate
antigovernment discourse to their own experiences of disempowerment in the rural
West.”); WUTHNOW, supra note 3, at 11–12 (claiming that rural outrage that surprised
many after the 2016 presidential election “was there well before, and would have been
evident had anyone bothered to look. It did not happen overnight and is unlikely to diminish
anytime soon”).
147. Cf. SHERMAN, DIVIDING PARADISE, supra note 145; but see WUTHNOW, supra
note 3, at 178 (noting farmers’ in-depth knowledge of “the government” encompassed
“multiple federal and state agencies and different types of laws, agricultural regulations,
and legislation”).
148. Cf. Laura McKinney, Reinventing Rural Environmental Justice, in
REINVENTING RURAL: NEW REALITIES IN AN URBANIZING WORLD 57 (Lexington Books
2016) (noting unique features of rural environmental injustice, neglect of rural conditions
in literature, and Superfund remediation process’s structural features disadvantaging rural
cleanup and prioritizing urban remediation); Lisa R. Pruitt, The Rural
Lawscape: Space Tames Law Tames Space, in THE EXPANDING SPACES OF LAW: A TIMELY
LEGAL GEOGRAPHY (Irus Braverman et al. eds., 2014) (articulating the uniqueness of rural
relationships with law).
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of the United States. This analysis includes studies focused on such diverse
places as California, Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, New Mexico, Utah,
Washington State, and Wisconsin, and across Black, Native American,
Latinx, and white rural populations. Further, critically, not all of the
grievances described in the following, despite being grouped together
under certain categories, are assumed to be moral equivalents. It is clear,
for instance, that a Native American tribe losing hunting rights on land
that has been considered sacred for thousands of years is simply not the
same as a white rancher having to shrink her grazing area. Nonetheless,
the common outcome of such exclusions—alienation from an agency and
a perception of it as an impediment to a way of life—seems important to
highlight.
Fourth, this discussion spans multiple federal agencies, including the
U.S. Department of Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service and Bureau of
Land Management, the Department of Agriculture, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, the Department of Energy, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Department of Health and Human Services.
While each of these agencies implicates different legal mandates and
processes, structural themes relevant to the regulatory state as a whole are
elucidated in Part IV. Further, while strengths and success stories in ruralfederal relationships certainly exist, this Section focuses on weaknesses
and problems first in order to offer a diagnosis. Part V draws on those
strengths and success stories to illuminate solutions.
1. Rural Communities Perceive Procedural Injustice in
Interactions with the Regulatory State Through a Common
Sense of Procedural Exclusion, Powerlessness, and Being
Belittled
A key ingredient in illegitimacy problems is the experience of some
form of procedural injustice. As discussed above, procedural injustice may
be defined as “experiences in which individuals feel treated unfairly” by
government, perceptions that government actors have behaved
disrespectfully, and perceptions of a dismissive stance on the part of
government toward community members’ rights and concerns.149 Other
literature on procedural justice emphasizes the importance of rights of
participation, opportunities to voice concerns regarding binding decisions,
and acceptance of decisions’ soundness or substantive accuracy, at least to
a reasonable degree.150 The literature on rural populations’ perceptions of

149. See Bell, supra note 7, at 2100.
150. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181,
320 (2004) (articulating the theory of procedural justice as an essential prerequisite for
legitimacy).
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the regulatory state seems largely in alignment with this aspect of
illegitimacy.
One of the most prominent themes among rural feelings toward the
regulatory state is a sense of powerlessness in rural communities’
relationships with federal agencies and the federal government more
broadly.151 This sense of exclusion has even been characterized as feeling
bullied or belittled in interactions with federal agencies. For instance, rural
sociologist Jennifer Sherman’s 2014 study of longtime residents of
Paradise Valley, Washington, a declining farming and ranching
community, elicited many of these themes from those she interviewed.
Sherman did not, unlike other researchers, hear “talk of either moral
outrage or minorities having cut the line.”152 Instead, “much of the
frustration that old-timers [longtime local residents] expressed had to do
with the experience of being unimportant or unheard,” especially in their
relationships with federal agencies including the U.S. Forest Service and
Bureau of Land Management; many residents “connected antigovernment
sentiments to concrete experiences of vulnerability or abuse at the hands
of these larger entities.”153
In an earlier study by Sherman in the northern California timber
community of Golden Valley, she found a similar sense of
disempowerment among residents. Sherman conducted the study from
2003 to 2004, just over a decade after the Fish and Wildlife Service listed
the spotted owl as a protected endangered species in 1990, a federal move
that saw substantial local opposition at the time and had severe subsequent
economic ripple effects. Sherman observed irony in the national media
coverage of the controversy as one of “owls versus loggers” because “both
owls and loggers were affected populations that had little to no agency in
the decisions.”154 She noted that, “While loggers had major stakes in the
outcome, ultimately they were just workers within the forest industry . . . .
They were unable to influence the outcome in any area except the public’s
imagination,” a powerlessness that in turn fueled their perception of the
listing as an unwarranted attack on their way of life.155
These feelings of exclusion and belittlement at the hands of federal
agencies have been observed in diverse rural communities.156 For instance,
151. See, e.g., MALIN, supra note 144, at 53 (noting that residents in former Colorado
uranium communities expressed a sense of powerlessness and vulnerability about lack of
government transparency and environmental degradation).
152. SHERMAN, DIVIDING PARADISE, supra note 145, at 176.
153. Id. at 176–80; see also Su, supra note 3, at 844 (noting common rural sense of
lack of agency and control).
154. SHERMAN, THOSE WHO WORK, supra note 145, at 35.
155. Id. at 36.
156. As another example, one scholar attributes a lawsuit filed by the New Mexico
Department of Game and Fish against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service as “a
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complaints about procedural exclusion have been raised in the context of
federal agencies’ obligations to consult with Native American tribes and
Western local governments affected by large public land holdings.157
Rowe, Finley, and Baldwin argue that while some federal consultations
with tribes comport with best practices and often meet the legally required
procedural minimums, “consultations usually meet the letter of the law
while providing tribes with little opportunity to meaningfully shape
agency decisions.”158 This has led to “a widespread perception among
tribes” that consultation processes fail “to adequately and substantively
incorporate tribes’ concerns in the planning process.”159 Others report that
agencies do not necessarily comply with legal requirements due to a lack
of enforceability, and thus, “tribal officials understandably become
disillusioned and the federal-tribal relationship suffers long-term
damage.”160
Rural sociologist Loka Ashwood found similar sentiments
surrounding public meetings that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
conducted in a community of Black and white residents in Burke County,
Georgia. These meetings were perceived as “scripted actions defined by
bureaucratic rules.”161 White and Black residents alike in Burke County
felt hopeless, even threatened, in their relationships with the local nuclear
power plant that the NRC was perceived to support to the severe detriment
of the community.162 If local residents went up against “the system”—the
joint powerhouse of the plant and the NRC—it was understood that there
would be backlash, such as lost jobs.163 Local activist Reverend Samuel
Franklin attempted to support the efforts of white activists who came from
direct response to fears that distant elites were usurping local control” over conservation
efforts. Firlein, supra note 14, at 339–40; see also Stephanie A. Malin, Depressed
Democracy, Environmental Injustice: Exploring the Negative Mental Health Implications
of Unconventional Oil and Gas Production in the United States, 70 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC.
SCI. 1 (2020) (attributing rural residents’ sense of powerlessness, barriers to participation
in decisionmaking, and lack of access to information about unconventional oil and gas
production to “federal regulatory vacuum” of the sector).
157. See Matthew J. Rowe et al., Accountability or Merely “Good Words”? An
Analysis of Tribal Consultation Under the National Environmental Policy Act and the
National Historic Preservation Act, 8 ARIZ. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2018).
158. Id. at 19.
159. Id. at 5; see also Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes:
The Foundation of Enlightened Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of Shame?, 24 AM.
IND. L. REV. 21, 49 (1999); Colette Routel & Jeffrey Holth, Toward Genuine Tribal
Consultation in the 21st Century, 46 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 417 (2013); Kurt E. Dongoske
et al., Environmental Reviews and Case Studies: The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and the Silencing of Native American Worldviews, 17 ENV’T PRAC. 36 (2015).
160. Routel & Holth, supra note 159, at 467.
161. See ASHWOOD, supra note 13, at 167.
162. See id. at ix (“William, like his black and white Burke County neighbors, harbors
a deep-seated distrust of the government.”).
163. See id. at 161.
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out of town to advocate reform, but “ma[d]e it clear that he had little hope
in the efficacy of their go-through-the-government ways.”164 Ashwood
highlights “a simple truth relied on by those perpetually disinherited in the
Burke County [B]lack community: God, not government, would deliver
justice.”165
In the local government context, many local government officials,
especially in the West where federal agencies manage large amounts of
public land, have complained about agencies’ “highly variable planning
processes” and the use of “technocratic language that means very little to
local communities,” exacerbating local feelings of exclusion and
powerlessness.166 As one scholar states,
when larger governmental units, like the federal government, ignore
issues raised by smaller units, like state and local government, it
appears as though the larger units are dismissing rural communities
and their concerns . . . . By failing to account for the issues raised by
smaller governmental units, larger governmental units effectively
disregard rural communities.167

2. Rural Communities’ Unfavorable Views of the Regulatory
State Are Often Based on a Common Sense of Deep
Frustration with Substantive Outcomes
Rural residents have also expressed disillusionment or frustration
with the substantive outcomes of federal agencies’ decisions that affect
them.168 Rural commentary tends to characterize federal agencies as
capricious, unpredictable, and failing to serve local needs, if not actively
harming residents.169 Overall, federal regulatory processes are perceived
as detached, heartless, and meaningless, seeking to impose uninformed
plans on rural communities through one-size-fits-all frameworks with little
regard for local conditions and needs.170 Two common themes among rural
164. Id. at 159; cf. HARRISON, supra note 144, at 131 (explaining that residents
complaining of pesticide poisoning were dismissed by regulatory officials).
165. ASHWOOD, supra note 13, at 158.
166. See Bryan et al., supra note 95, at 20; see also Su, supra note 3, at 867, 873
(observing that unlike local governments, federal agencies are not directly responsive to
local constituents and agencies tend to use “top-down” approach in rural communities).
167. Firlein, supra note 14, at 341.
168. See Su, supra note 3, at 874.
169. See SHERMAN, DIVIDING PARADISE, supra note 145, at 19; Brody Hinds,
Comment, Twenty-Five Years Later: The Amendments to the National Historic
Preservation Act and Tribal Consultation, 42 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 141, 141–42 (2017)
(“[F]ederal managers in charge of sacred sites are frequently unaware of their significance
to Native peoples and often do not know the best way to preserve them.”).
170. See WUTHNOW, supra note 3, at 106–09; Robert Bonnie et al., Understanding
Rural Attitudes Toward the Environment and Conservation in America, DUKE NICHOLAS
INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY SOLUTIONS 18 (2020), https://bit.ly/3IW6Xvi
(describing how rural interviewees and focus group participants viewed federal
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frustrations with substantive outcomes emerged in this analysis: (1) a
perception that agency outcomes make it harder to make a living; and (2)
a perception that agency outcomes fail to protect rural residents from
threats.
a. A Perception that Agency Outcomes Make It Harder to
Make a Living
Threats to livelihoods are a prominent theme in the literature on rural
sentiments toward the regulatory state. Perceptions of those threats range
in degree and depend upon who is asked. On one end of that spectrum,
sentiments may involve relatively mild frustrations with agency decisions
that seem inconvenient or unwise. On the other hand, sentiments may
involve a deep sense of betrayal and oppression. The experiences of Black
farmers at the hands of the U.S. Department of Agriculture provide a
particularly egregious illustration of a federal agency crushing a rural
population’s livelihoods while also failing to offer protection from threats,
the theme discussed below. Through its support of discriminatory county
commissioners who undermined Black farmers’ access to essential credit
and benefit programs, and its failure to investigate subsequent civil rights
complaints, the USDA’s role in the massive dispossession of Black-owned
farmland over the past several decades helped the agency earn its
reputation as “the last plantation” among Black rural populations.171
Diverse rural populations continue to perceive the regulatory state as
a danger to livelihoods and economic well-being. For instance, certain
Native American tribes have expressed fears about the regulatory state as
a threat to local economic dependence on coal extraction.172 Tribes have
also struggled to maintain subsistence livelihoods due to a lack of control
over public lands they have historically depended on for survival.173 As
one example, one commentator describes “widespread dissatisfaction
bureaucratic processes as favoring one-size-fits-all policies that did not consider rural
needs in environmental policymaking and created potentially unnecessary hardships).
171. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 85–89 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 206 F.3d
1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Angela P. Harris, (Re)integrating Spaces: The Color of Farming, 2
SAVANNAH L. REV. 157, 179 (2015) (attributing 98% decrease in Black farmers between
1920 and 1997 to partition suits and “credit discrimination perpetrated by the federal
government itself through the USDA”).
172. Julie Turkewitz, Tribes That Live Off Coal Hold Tight to Trump’s Promises,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2017), https://nyti.ms/3hMRxi7 (quoting Crow tribe energy director
as saying “Obama was a great president” but his energy policies “would have devastated
the tribe”).
173. See, e.g., Elizaveta Barrett Ristroph, Traditional Cultural Districts: An
Opportunity for Alaska Tribes to Protect Subsistence Rights and Traditional Lands, 31
ALASKA L. REV. 211, 229 (2014); Sophie Thériault et al., The Legal Protection of
Subsistence: A Prerequisite of Food Security for the Inuit of Alaska, 22 ALASKA L. REV.
35, 37 (2005) (noting rural residents’ and Natives’ prioritization of allocation of fish and
game among different users).
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among the Alaska Native community with the limited nature of the federal
subsistence program” managed by the Department of Interior.174
Predominately white residents in extractive and land-based industries
often see the regulatory state as a threat to their livelihoods.175 The Fosters,
a married couple interviewed by Sherman in her Paradise Valley study,
expressed the perception that agencies made their way of life harder.
“[L]ike a number of other farmers and ranchers in the area,” Sherman
observed, the Fosters “experienced the government as an outside force
whose whims were unpredictable and seldom responsive to their needs.”176
The law itself was considered an unpredictable barrier to making a living.
Interviewees working in farming and ranching “often faced overwhelming
challenges related to changing regulations. In addition to labor laws and
water regulations, grazing permits were a major source of frustration for a
number of old-timers in the cattle industry, many of whom complained at
length about the decrease in public land available to them.”177
The Fosters explained that “over the years government regulations
and interventions had repeatedly challenged their livelihood.”178 They
added, “We had to get out of the orchard industry because [of] regulations
. . . [W]e couldn’t keep up with . . . what the government wanted to do
. . . . [I]t was ridiculous, but it was the law.”179 The couple said that
“changing labor regulations made it difficult” to continue in the orchard
business and “they also struggled with changing rules regarding
irrigation.”180 Changes in conservation priorities “contributed to their
experiences of loss and betrayal.”181 In general, the sense of powerlessness
felt by locals in Paradise Valley “was exacerbated by the feeling that those
same agencies [the Forest Service, BLM, and state Department of
Ecology] gave back little to the community, abandoning local populations
while continually imposing new obstacles.”182
Agency decisions are also often considered detached from local
needs and knowledge.183 One rancher:
174. Robert T. Anderson, Sovereignty and Subsistence: Native Self-Government and
Rights to Hunt, Fish, and Gather After ANCSA, 33 ALASKA L. REV. 187, 215 (2016).
175. SHERMAN, DIVIDING PARADISE, supra note 145, at 178 (noting that longtime
rural residents considered “land use policies and government regulations” to be “the most
immediate threat to their livelihoods”).
176. Id. at 182.
177. Id. at 183.
178. Id. at 183.
179. Id. at 181–82.
180. Id. at 182.
181. Id. at 184.
182. Id. at 180.
183. See, e.g., Bonnie et al., supra note 170, at 19 (“I think the biggest frustration [is]
. . . the people that try and regulate things aren’t the people involved in the day to day, so
they think they know what’s good or best but they’re not having people that are actually
part of what they’re trying to regulate in the conversation.”).
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described fighting with the Fish and Wildlife Agency over grazing
rights to public lands, explaining that it failed to recognize that grazing
was only detrimental to ecosystems when cows were fenced in too
tightly. [She said,] “[T]hey have attorneys writing these things up, and
attorneys answering why you shouldn’t graze, but they don’t address
animal health or biosecurity or things that are important. . . . They kind
of harassed us and it’s unbelievable. . . . We had to sell a lot of cows
because we just had our private land to graze them on.”184

In her Paradise Valley study, Sherman found that antigovernment
discourse on the news mirrored rural residents’ “personal trials, including
individual experiences with seemingly capricious agencies, institutions,
and agendas that had negatively impacted their lives and livelihoods[,] . . .
[exhibiting] raw frustration with specific agencies and interventions that
impacted their daily existence and way of life.”185 Even an employee of
the U.S. Forest Service described it as top-down, bloated, and useless,
stating, “we all agree that we [the Forest Service] do nothing.”186
Another study highlighted rural residents’ frustrations with
conservation initiatives that were perceived as an imposition of
disproportionate local burdens based on detached or uninformed urban
priorities.187 In response to Fish and Wildlife efforts to conserve wolf
populations, a rancher in New Mexico stated,
People in the East view this part of the country as empty public lands
and think it should stay that way. They don’t have a clue what it’s like.
All this is done on a whim. Why should ranchers be prepared to take
losses just so some New York City guy can sleep well knowing there’s
wolves in the wild?188

Another rancher said, “Take the wolves and plant em in Central Park,
cause they impose it on us to have these goddamn wolves!”189 In a similar
vein, in Sherman’s study of Golden Valley, she found that locals
universally blamed the Fish and Wildlife Service spotted owl listing for
“the sudden and devastating deterioration of their town and the local labor
market.”190
b. A Perception that Agency Outcomes Fail to Protect

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

SHERMAN, DIVIDING PARADISE, supra note 145, at 183.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 180; CRAMER, supra note 2, at 150–51, 189.
See Firlein, supra note 14, at 339.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
SHERMAN, THOSE WHO WORK, supra note 145, at 35.
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Locals from Threats
Many rural residents crave greater protection from, or remediation of,
threats, including severe environmental and public health hazards. This
desire for protection comes in a variety of forms; unexplained cancer
clusters and inedible fish surrounding polluted sites in Louisiana, Georgia,
and Utah, for instance, drive residents’ sense of a need for action.191 Yet
those residents, too, often find reason to question whether the regulatory
state has their best interests in mind.192
One Louisiana resident interviewed by sociologist Arlie Hochschild,
African American U.S. Army Lieutenant General Russel Honoré,
remarked how the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency “passes the
buck” to the industry-captured state government of Louisiana, leaving
residents vulnerable to private sector whims and hazardous pollution.193
Black residents interviewed by Ashwood in Burke County, Georgia,
expressed similar views: they desperately wanted protection from hazards
associated with the local nuclear plant, but the NRC was regularly
perceived to side with industry over locals.194
In the predominately white town of Monticello, Utah, where two
Superfund sites were designated in 1989 due to legacies of uranium
processing, environmental sociologist Stephanie Malin found that the
federal government was perceived as having abandoned local residents
after using them for decades of energy production.195 The Superfund sites
“have been linked to ongoing, contested, and under-addressed
environmental and health issues,” including cancer clusters.196 However,
multiple federal agencies, including the Department of Energy and the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, “did not conclude that
the cancer clusters were related to uranium exposure, despite noting

191. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 3, at 32, 59 (“Everyone I talked to wanted a clean
environment.”); Malin, supra note 144, at 57 (“Most uranium community residents know
that the federal government and corporations have still not adequately addressed the
legacies of uranium’s previous booms . . . .”).
192. As one example, a West Virginia activist working to counteract coal’s legacy
through community gardening complained, “Your larger USDA grants, the Community
Food Projects grants, going back and looking at the funded ones, they’re all in urban areas.
And I think rural – it’s an area that people have their own assumptions about, they think
that people are really self-sufficient.” Elyzabeth W. Engle, “Coal Is in Our Food, Coal Is
in Our Blood”: Everyday Environmental Injustices of Rural Community Gardening in
Central Appalachia, 24 LOCAL ENV’T 746, 755 (2019).
193. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 3, at 59
194. See ASHWOOD, supra note 13, at 167.
195. See MALIN, supra note 144, at 60. Malin’s fieldwork took place from 2005 to
2009. See id. at 3.
196. Id.
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elevated rates of various cancers in the community.”197 This has led to
community members feeling “ignored by federal agencies and scientists,
reporting . . . that they did not receive satisfactory responses to their public
health concerns.”198 This dissatisfaction spurred the growth of a local
activist group devoted to holding federal agencies accountable “because
they were tired of seeing neighbors suffer illnesses without explanation
and felt they deserved more honesty from the federal government,” and
that they should “make the federal government right the wrong they did to
the community.”199
In sociologist Jill Lindsey Harrison’s California-based study
examining the phenomenon of “pesticide drift”—the problem of
hazardous pesticides moving through the air into residential areas—
interviewees were similarly disillusioned with federal regulatory
institutions. Activists interviewed in the study included “a diverse array of
Latino/a farmworkers and their family members, other low-income
agricultural community residents of color, and white, middle-class, and
upper-middle class professionals.”200 Interviewees expressed the belief
that cooperative tactics with federal and state regulatory officials (as well
as with industry) “have failed to protect residents from pesticide
exposure,” motivating activists to adopt more confrontational tactics with
government institutions.201
In general, a notable feature of rural concerns about both economic
and environmental precarity, and the role of federal agencies in relation to
both, is that the industries locals economically depend upon may well also
be the industries that pose the greatest threats to local ecologies and public
health. 202 Due to rural regions’ relative isolation and lack of economic
alternatives, this tension can result in a unique alchemy influencing rural
sentiments toward industry and the regulatory state, which may strike
outsiders as contradictory.203

197. Id. at 63. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry is an agency
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. See Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry, ATSDR, https://bit.ly/3DuCPXa (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).
198. MALIN, supra note 144, at 63.
199. Id.
200. HARRISON, supra note 144, at 22. The populations disproportionately affected
by pesticide drift are mostly Latino immigrant farm working communities. See id. at 41.
201. Id. at 172.
202. See, e.g., Stephanie A. Malin and Kathryn Teigen DeMaster, A Devil’s Bargain:
Rural Environmental Injustices and Hydraulic Fracturing on Pennsylvania’s Farms, 47 J.
OF RURAL STUD. 278 (2016) (describing “devil’s bargain” faced by small Pennsylvania
farmers involved with shale gas extraction and associated inequities).
203. Cf. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 3, at 32 (describing, as part of “Great Paradox” of
rural voters seeming to vote against their interests, the presence of “great pollution and
great resistance to regulating polluters” in Louisiana).
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Specifically, many residents remain loyal to the polluting industries
that employ them or those they know, while other residents desire
environmental justice and for the polluting industries to leave. Race, class,
and views of federal agencies interact with these factors. For instance,
although white rural workers and residents often bear environmental
injustice burdens too, they are more likely than communities of color to
enjoy some of the hazardous industries’ economic benefits.204 These
interacting factors help explain white rural populations’ propensity to want
less government intervention despite perceiving industry’s threats, and to
side with industry over the regulatory state because at least industry has
something to offer them—unlike agencies, which are perceived to be
ineffectual anyway.205 These disparities also help explain rural minorities’
greater desire for protection through the regulatory state rather than
wanting agencies to simply leave them alone, even though many remain
hopeless or disillusioned that such protection is attainable.206
3. Rural Communities Experience a Community-Level Sense
of Tension with the Regulatory State
Members of a community may perceive maltreatment targeted
toward others as a sign that the community as a whole stands in tension
with a particular institution.207 Vicarious negative experiences can “feed
into a more general, cultural sense of alienation,” making perceptions of
illegitimacy emerge from “the cumulative, collective experience of
procedural and substantive injustice.”208 Communities may develop a
“collective memory” of interactions with government actors, or a “cultural
conception of what it is like to interact” with government actors “that
emanates in part from membership in a group or identity category.”209 In
short, this prong involves a sense of distrust of institutions and their

204. Thomas E. Shriver and Gary R. Webb, Rethinking the Scope of Environmental
Justice: Perceptions of Health Hazards in a Rural Native American Community Exposed
to Carbon Black, 74 RURAL SOC. 270, 272 (2009).
205. Cf. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 3, at 166 (describing local resident’s loss of a horse
due to environmental contamination, but her insistence not to “allow her sadness to
interfere with her loyalty to industry”); id. at 17 (quoting local resident describing
government as “too big, too greedy, too incompetent, too bought”).
206. See ASHWOOD, supra note 13, at 158; Shriver & Webb, supra note 204, at 278,
284–85 (describing Native American interviewees in rural environmental justice
community as perceiving “an institutionalized system of racism, neglect, and denial” and
lack of assessment or standards by EPA, the Centers for Disease Control, OSHA, and in
particular the Oklahoma state environmental agency to address severe local
contamination).
207. See Bell, supra note 7, at 2104.
208. Id. at 2105.
209. See id. at 2106.
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activities not because “they do bad things to me,” but because “they do
bad things to us.”
This factor also emerges as a theme in the literature on rural
relationships with the regulatory state. In particular, there is a collective
sense of the regulatory state as a frequent antagonist in an “us-versusthem” relationship. Rural populations often express resignation to the fact
that agencies serve some group or population other than them.210 The “us”
tends to connote a place-based identity under attack—local, rural, or
industry-related, for instance—although it also intersects with overlapping
identities, such as race and class.211 The “them,” or the populations or
entities agencies are perceived to serve to the detriment of rural residents,
tend to include urban residents and corporations.212 The antagonistic
relationship, then, is that rural residents often perceive the regulatory state
to serve corporate interests and urban elites in an attack on rural ways of
life. For rural communities of color, these perceptions are also intertwined
with the understanding that the regulatory state systematically prioritizes
the interests of white people.213
The regulatory state’s perceived fealty to concentrated corporate
interests in general is a regular theme among diverse rural residents’
views.214 For instance, in Sherman’s Paradise Valley study, she observed
that “[m]any old-timers . . . found federal rules and regulations capricious,
serving large and outside interests while oppressing and impoverishing
small-scale operations.”215 This sense of joint corporate-regulatory

210. See, e.g., SHERMAN, DIVIDING PARADISE, supra note 144, at 180–81.
211. See, e.g., ASHWOOD, supra note 13, at 69 (quoting several local residents
characterizing nuclear plant as a “they” threatening local landownership, aesthetics, and
traditions in interest of greed); SHERMAN, THOSE WHO WORK, supra note 145, at 35.
212. Cf. SHERMAN, THOSE WHO WORK, supra note 145, at 38 (describing
Northwestern loggers’ sense that spotted owl controversy was “a clash of urban versus
traditional rural cultures, with the latter being overwhelmed and devalued by the former”);
James R. Rasband, The Rise of Urban Archipelagoes in the American West: A New
Reservation Policy?, 31 ENV’T L. 1, 44 (2001) (suggesting that urban newcomers to
Western archipelagos advocating preservation and recreation on public lands ought to
recognize interests of communities that preceded them in Western land uses).
213. See, e.g., ASHWOOD, supra note 13, at 173 (quoting a Black local resident
describing the local nuclear plant as “white authority”).
214. See SHERMAN, DIVIDING PARADISE, supra note 145, at 180–81 (discussing the
statements of a former farmer-turned-construction worker that “[h]is experiences in the
1980s with government buyouts for small farmers had convinced him that the government
served only large corporate interests . . . . Many old-timers . . . found federal rules and
regulations capricious, serving large and outside interests while oppressing and
impoverishing small-scale operations”); see also Chris M. Messer & Thomas E. Shriver,
Corporate Responses to Claims of Environmental Misconduct: The Case of Phelps Dodge
and Blackwell, Oklahoma, 30 DEVIANT BEHAV. 647, 660–65 (2009) (articulating the
polluting company’s use of relationships with EPA and CDC and compliance with their
standards in efforts to legitimize its environmental misconduct).
215. SHERMAN, DIVIDING PARADISE, supra note 145, at 181.
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antagonism may involve more of an urgent sense of immediate violence,
as with agencies’ perceived failure to address problems of worker abuse,
pesticide poisoning, and other forms of industry exploitation in Harrison’s
pesticide drift study.216 A central theme of Ashwood’s several years of
fieldwork in Georgia revolved around both actual and perceived regulatory
fealty to corporate interests in a system Ashwood calls “for-profit
democracy.”217 A local former NRC regulator Ashwood spoke to
emphasized the importance of plant profits and balanced budgets in the
short-term over safety and long-term planning to NRC decisionmaking
and stated, “Industry is the biggest stakeholder, with the most influence
. . . . It is not the public. It is not Congress, because industry influences
them.”218
The regulatory state’s perceived fealty to urban elites also emerges
often as a theme. The discussion above of disappointments with agency
decisionmaking illustrates this view: conservation initiatives, in particular,
are often viewed as uninformed urbanites imposing an impractical and
oppressive vision on regions they neither care about nor understand.219
Although “jobs versus environment” tensions are a classic example, the
perception of urbanites imposing their priorities on rural regions through
the regulatory state is not limited to that conflict. For instance, one study
documented rural educators’ belief that federal education laws,
administered through the Department of Education, are “designed
primarily for urban and suburban districts and poorly suited for rural
districts.”220
Generally, scholars have described rural perceptions of the regulatory
state’s effect on their lives as the feeling that their very way of life is being
taken from them.221 This sense of attack may have to do with the
disappointment in substantive outcomes discussed above; losses of
livelihoods and environmental destruction can each represent the
deterioration of a regional culture. But many also lament the destruction
or enclosure of both private and public local landscapes that they had once
engaged with more intimately, freely, safely, and meaningfully.222 Federal
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See HARRISON, supra note 144.
ASHWOOD, supra note 13, at 69.
Id. at 16.
Id.; see also Bonnie et al., supra note 170, at 28.
Lars D. Johnson et al., Federal Education Policy in Rural America,
BELLWETHER EDUC. PARTNERS 16 (Dec. 31, 2014), https://bit.ly/3r0KOpx; Deena
Dulgerian, The Impact of the Every Student Succeeds Act on Rural Schools, 24 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 111, 112 (2016).
221. See Erin Morrow, Agri-Environmentalism: A Farm Bill for 2007, 38 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 345, 348 (2006).
222. See, e.g., SHERMAN, THOSE WHO WORK, supra note 145, at 35; see also STEVEN
STOLL, RAMP HOLLOW: THE ORDEAL OF APPALACHIA (2017) (examining the history of
Appalachian land dispossession and coal extraction).
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agencies are often viewed as culpable in this enclosure, whether as
landowners themselves that newly restricted access or as supporters of
dominant industry players. Thus, many rural residents view federal
agencies as playing a role in helping take their childhoods, landscapes,
memories, and folkways away.223
Importantly, as Ashwood observes, the sense of “us-versus-them” is
not as simple as “rural versus federal agencies and their real beneficiaries.”
For instance, both Black and white residents of Burke County, including
those who worked for the nuclear plant, viewed the NRC and the nuclear
power plant as a dominating threat. But racial segregation and tension
remained poignant in the community such that Black and white residents
did not see themselves as united as one community against the plant.224
Black residents in fact attempted to recruit Ashwood (who is white) during
her field research to reach out to white locals to protest the construction of
new reactors.225 Thus, while rural marginalization is common across both
of these communities, experiences and reactions vary based on other
intersectional identities. In their views of the regulatory state, shaped by
hopelessness and powerlessness, white locals, Ashwood observed, turned
to right-wing politics, while Black locals turned to the church.226
Rural communities of color are often certain that the regulatory state
operates in service of white supremacy, providing small- and large-scale
material benefits to white populations to rural minorities’ severe
disadvantage.227 The explanations for this view often involve egregious
stories of federal agencies’ complicity in racial marginalization. For
instance, one study involving interviews with Black farmers in the
Mississippi Delta revealed that “[t]hey believed that the [USDA lending
agency] Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) ha[d] intentionally tried
to drive them out of business by not providing loans in a timely manner
and by foreclosing on their operations.”228 The distrust Native American
communities often hold toward the federal government and its agencies

223. See ASHWOOD, supra note 13, at 8–10, 69.
224. See id. at 232 (noting the observation in Burke County that Black and white
people rarely interacted, informing scholarly decision to present black and white
experiences distinctly).
225. See id.
226. ASHWOOD, supra note 13, at 14 (describing local residents as “turning to guns
and God” as an “outlet for justice and the retribution denied by what Karl Polanyi called
the market society”).
227. See, e.g., MALIN, supra note 144, at 140 (describing activists’ views on
environmental racism and the regulatory state’s complicity therein).
228. Spencer D. Wood and Jess Glibert, Returning African American Farmers to the
Land: Recent Trends and a Policy Rationale, 27 REV. BLACK POLITICAL ECON. 43, 57
(2000).
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has been characterized as centuries old, informed by the trauma of
displacement, genocide, and other forms of violence.229
To be clear, rural populations have often expressed enthusiastic
sentiments about federal agencies’ aspirations and activities. For instance,
one New Mexico rancher, despite his skepticism of the Endangered
Species Act, described it as “a thing of beauty.”230 But the evidence
explored here is ample and concerning. Throughout the country and across
demographics—despite important variations—scholarly investigations
have found themes of hopelessness, powerlessness, disappointment,
frustration, betrayal, and antagonism in rural populations’ perceptions of
the regulatory state. These themes are largely in alignment with the
conditions giving rise to perceptions of government illegitimacy. The next
Part compares these subjective accounts to certain objective structural
features of the regulatory state in order to further contextualize rural
sentiments.
IV. STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE REGULATORY STATE THAT ALIGN
WITH RURAL VIEWS
In his study of small towns throughout the United States, sociologist
Robert Wuthnow observes that “[r]ural communities’ views of
Washington[, D.C.,] usually emerge in two competing narratives: on the
one hand, the government ignores us and doesn’t do anything to help with
our problems, and, on the other hand, the government constantly intrudes
in our lives without understanding us and thus makes our problems
worse.”231 Sherman found similar attitudes in her study of Paradise Valley,
where longtime residents “described senses of being both invaded and
abandoned.”232
This Part explores how feelings such as these and those examined
above find a basis in objective structural aspects of the regulatory state.
Section IV.A observes that a rural sense of powerlessness and exclusion
from regulatory decisionmaking is not inconsistent with the literature on
barriers to public participation. Section IV.B asserts that regulatory tradeoffs and burdens in rural communities have almost certainly been
underappreciated based on the ways agency decisionmaking processes
tend to operate. Section IV.C assesses the legal history of the deregulation
229. See Amy Head, The Death of the New Buffalo: The Fifth Circuit Slays Indian
Gaming in Texas, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 377, 382 (2003); see also Nathan Munier et al.,
Determinants of Rural Latino Trust in the Federal Government, 37 HISP. J. BEHAV. SCI.
420, 432–34 (2015) (connecting distrust of federal government in rural Latino population
in Illinois to harsh federal measures taken against immigrants and sense that federal
institutions ignore Latinos’ concerns and “are incapable of taking their desires seriously”).
230. See Morrow, Environmental Front, supra note 4, at 193.
231. WUTHNOW, supra note 3, at 9.
232. SHERMAN, DIVIDING PARADISE, supra note 145, at 176.
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era as a story of the regulatory state excising rural regions from a
substantial part of its purview, in turn helping explain the perception of
rural abandonment or exclusion by the regulatory state. The overall picture
that emerges is that over the past several decades, the regulatory state has
simultaneously abandoned, exploited, and encroached upon rural
communities in ways that would help explain the sentiments explored in
Part III.
A. Are Rural Populations Structurally Excluded from Agency
Avenues for Public Participation?
The common sense of voicelessness expressed by rural residents in
the discussion above is not particularly surprising viewed alongside the
structure of, and literature on, avenues for public participation in agency
decisionmaking. First, NPRMs are widely recognized to be inaccessible to
average people.233 The same barriers that marginalize individuals and
populations in other ways—including race and class—act as barriers to
participation in regulatory governance.
Geography, though, is likely an underappreciated barrier to
participation in NPRMs. For instance, most comments on NPRMs are
submitted online today. However, rural residents and tribes have
substantially more limited access to the high-speed internet that would
help make them equal participants in that process.234 Even if a particular
rural resident or under-resourced interest group had the means to
participate in an NPRM, it is not clear that such participation would afford
the meaningful “voice” associated with perceptions of procedural justice.
As to local collaborations between residents and agencies, the legal
frameworks for these processes are highly variable and context specific.
This suggests that whether a local public meeting is considered
perfunctory or not could largely turn on an individual agency or bureau’s
professional culture and commitment to collaboration.235 In any event, the
rural sentiments expressed above are not unrealistic when compared to the
structure and nature of processes for local-federal collaboration.

233. Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Glen Staszewski, Democratizing Rule Development,
98 WASH. U. L. REV. 793, 797 (2021).
234. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FCC-19-44, 2019 BROADBAND
DEPLOYMENT REPORT 16.
235. See, e.g., Ann Eisenberg, Alienation and Reconciliation in Social-Ecological
Systems, 47 ENV’T L. 127 (2017) (discussing collaborative, multi-stakeholder planning
process at Malheur Wildlife Refuge as example of success story).
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B. Are Rural Populations Subject to Unfavorable Substantive
Outcomes of Agency decisions?
The two types of unfavorable substantive agency outcomes discussed
above that are frequent objects of concern for rural communities include:
(1) agency decisions as a threat to livelihoods; and (2) agency action (or
inaction) providing inadequate protection from environmental threats.
This Section explores how agencies’ decisionmaking processes may well
help explain these rural fears. The discussion first proposes that costbenefit analysis and endangered species listings bear unique, underappreciated implications for rural welfare. Because rural populations are,
by definition, smaller and more sparse, their numbers will inevitably seem
less significant than other populations, positioning them as sacrificial
groups to bear disproportionate regulatory trade-offs in the name of
aggregate welfare. Decisionmaking processes have also not fully taken
geography into account, suggesting that additional, salient rural conditions
have likely not been factored into regulatory decisionmaking. The
insignificance of rural numbers and distributional considerations to agency
decisionmaking processes also help explain the regulatory state’s
perceived ineffectuality in the face of rural environmental injustice.
1. Regulatory Trade-Offs and Rural Livelihoods
a. Cost-Benefit Analysis
As a central component of agency rulemaking, cost-benefit analysis
centers on the mandate to federal agencies that they must, upon
recogniz[ing] that the private sector and private markets are the best
engine for economic growth . . . assess all costs and benefits of
available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not
regulating. Costs and benefits shall be understood to include both
quantifiable measures . . . and qualitative measures of costs and
benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to
consider. Further, in choosing among alternative regulatory
approaches, agencies should select those approaches that maximize net
benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public health
and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity),
unless a statute requires another regulatory approach.236

Agencies must adopt a regulation “only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its
costs.”237 The executive Office of Management and Budget (OMB),

236. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 1(a) (1993).
237. Id. § 1(b)(6).
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through its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), is
directed to provide coordinated review of agency rulemaking.238
Since the advent of modern environmental law in the 1970s,239
resource-dependent communities have complained that environmental
regulation poses unique risks to their livelihoods.240 As of 1970, more than
one third of rural employment was based in manufacturing, mining,
agriculture, forestry, and fishing.241 These sectors have remained
important lifelines for rural communities even until the late twentieth
century and today. These livelihoods have also often been among
relatively few economic opportunities for rural communities for a variety
of reasons; rural communities may lack other options because of distance
from population centers, exploitative treatment by corporations, other
drivers of a lack of economic diversification, and cultural attachments to
traditional ways of life.242
Thus, the potential trade-off with increased regulation is apparent: if
someone makes a living off of natural resources, and the law restricts the
use of those natural resources, that person’s livelihood seems positioned
to suffer.243 During the environmental era, legislators representing rural
constituents complained about more limited rural capacity to comply with
new federal standards;244 disproportionate impacts on rural communities,
such as unequal strains on profit margins for small businesses in rural areas

238. Id. § 2(b).
239. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.; 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.;
33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.
240. See, e.g., Frederick H. Buttel, Environmentalization: Origins, Processes, and
Implications for Rural Social Change, 57 RURAL SOCIO. 1, 24 (1992) (expressing hope that
environmentalism “adds to rather than detracts from the quest of the majority of the world’s
population to earn an adequate livelihood, have economic security, and live in dignity”);
Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1220 (1977)
(observing that uniform federal emission limitations on new cars imposed high costs on
rural areas while yielding few compensating benefits).
241. See Ann M. Eisenberg, Distributive Justice and Rural America, 61 B.C. L. REV.
189, 206–07 (2020).
242. See SHERMAN, DIVIDING PARADISE, supra note 145, at 4.
243. See Daniels et al., supra note 18, at 7–8 (describing zero-sum conflicts between
livelihoods and environmental protections, such as “endangered predators” being “pitted
against ranchers and river ecosystems against farming communities”); cf. Wendy Lee
Anderson, Book Note, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 377, 387 (1997) (reviewing THOMAS MICHAEL
POWER, LOST LANDSCAPES AND FAILED ECONOMIES: THE SEARCH FOR A VALUE OF PLACE
(1996)) (criticizing the characterization of anti-environmental backlash as solely funded by
corporations when local appeal seems apparent).
244. See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 16,490, 16,542 (1976) (statement of Rep. Ichord)
(complaining that expansion of the Clean Water Act 404 permit program was “an
unconscionable harassment to many rural Americans who have enough to worry about
without additional Federal redtape and penalties”).

786

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 126:3

compared to those in cities, and other forms of inequity;245 and likely
negative unintended consequences for rural populations, including
population loss, if certain restrictions or prohibitions were implemented.246
Commentary on the effects of environmental regulations on
employment regularly emphasizes that environmental regulations do not
cause net, long-term job losses at a societal level and that job losses “tend
to be dwarfed by the overall effects on public welfare.”247 This emphasis
on net job losses arguably reflects the tacit view that cost-benefit analysis’s
prioritization of aggregate welfare is an adequate measure of a particular
regulation’s desirability. However, more recently, environmental legal
scholarship has been reckoning with the fact that environmental
regulations’ effects on livelihoods in resource-dependent rural
communities are meaningful and need to be taken seriously in the interest
of fairness and defusing rural disaffection’s destabilizing force.248
Key aspects of cost-benefit analysis reveal why it would indeed be
inadequate to ensure full consideration of distributional needs in resourcedependent rural communities.249 Centrally, cost-benefit analysis
calculations do not traditionally or formally include anticipated jobs to be
lost as a result or indirect impact of a proposed regulation.250 Even where
245. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 10,359, 10,409 (1977) (statement of Rep. Roberts)
(raising concern about rural businesses’ ability to contribute mandated cost coverage for
wastewater treatment plants and arguing that such cost contributions would be less of a
burden for urban businesses).
246. See Predatory Mammals and Endangered Species: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the H. Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 92nd Cong. 341 (1972) (statement of Mr. Abner Rice, President, Oregon
Sheep Growers Association) (warning that predator control bill would cause chaos for
sheep grazers and force rural people off their land).
247. See N.Y.U. INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, DOES ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
KILL OR CREATE JOBS? (2017), https://bit.ly/32vMezA; HOCHSCHILD, supra note 3, at 284–
85 (questioning trade-offs between environmental conservation and jobs, noting lack of
regulatory effects on net employment and overall economic growth); Daniels et al., supra
note 18, at 4 (arguing that “environmentalists often resist, ignore, or dismiss” the
connection between environmental protection measures and their economic consequences,
“even when the economic consequences of environmental protection are obvious and even
when those consequences fall hardest on the poor and vulnerable”).
248. Cf. Revesz, supra note 18, at 1495, 1577–78.
249. Cf. Ian Scoones, Livelihoods Perspectives and Rural Development, 36 J.
PEASANT STUD. 171, 172 (2009) (describing the “[l]ivelihoods perspective[]” common in
rural development studies which examines “how different people in different places live,”
with particular emphasis on how people make a living using an approach in which one
“look[s] at the real world, and tr[ies] [to] understand things from local perspectives”);
Buttel, supra note 240, at 24 (remarking that environmentalism meant a new and dramatic
reversal of rural “inconsequentiality,” “bring[ing] rural societies and their environments
center stage,” and that environmentalization would “be crucial in determining whether the
new forms of social regulation of the economy that emerge will either reinforce the
growing inequality of the past decade or lead to new channels for the mobilization of
subordinate class demands”).
250. See Masur & Posner, supra note 103, at 603–23.
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OIRA does consider job losses, it lacks a standard for “how many jobs
must be lost for a regulation to be impermissible.”251 A likely explanation
for the exclusion of a more formalized job loss analysis is the common
assumption among economists that regulatorily-driven shocks to labor
markets will even out over time as displaced workers find new work.252
This approach poses unique problems for rural communities in two
ways. First, rural labor markets are more limited. The reasoning that job
markets will “clear” and recover may make some sense in some urban
contexts where labor markets are relatively robust. But it overlooks key
conditions in rural communities. A region’s ability to be resilient in the
face of a rash of job losses “will vary based on the population of the region
and the economic diversity of the industries present in it.”253 But as has
been demonstrated time and again with regular economic upheavals, rural
labor markets are less resilient, often dependent on one industry, and less
likely to bounce back from a shock, regulatory or otherwise. A shock to
such a labor market will have profound ripple effects, going so far as to
create the risk of regional fiscal collapse.254
Second, unique barriers impede displaced rural workers’ capacity to
start over again. As Masur and Posner observe, “Geographically isolated
workers may find it harder to travel to another location or find a new job
in the original location.”255 Regionally concentrated job losses generally
make it more costly for the unemployed to find new work.256 These
barriers to mobility mean that a key assumption many economists have as
to regulation, which is often reflected in regulatory decisions—that a lost
job is not all that dire because any given worker can find a new job—
simply does not hold up in the rural context.257
Discrete, region-specific job losses stemming from regulatorilydriven industry contractions are indeed observable.258 It may also be more
251. Id. at 582.
252. See id. at 582–83.
253. Id. at 632.
254. See generally Adele C. Morris et al., The Risk of Fiscal Collapse in Coal-Reliant
Communities, COLUM. CTR. GLOB. ENERGY POL’Y. (2019), https://brook.gs/3gCSAAD
(detailing risks of fiscal collapse of coal’s decline to coal-reliant communities).
255. See Masur & Posner, supra note 103, at 620.
256. Id.
257. Cf. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 3, at 51 (observing that many workers in Louisiana
petrochemical plants were torn between their love of local wilderness and their need to
maintain jobs in polluting industries).
258. See Marc A.C. Hafstead & Roberton C. Williams III, Unemployment and
Environmental Regulation in General Equilibrium, 160 J. PUB. ECON. 50, 51 (2018)
(acknowledging that “imposing a pollution tax causes a substantial employment drop in
the polluting sector” and “a substantial shift in employment between industries”); see also
Firlein, supra note 14, at 339 (quoting ranchers complaining of “The disproportionate
burdens placed on rural communities” by conservation efforts and how urban communities
“are not the ones who bear the costs of such conservation”).
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difficult to measure regulations’ trade-offs in rural places than is typically
acknowledged. Trade-offs are more complex than an easily quantifiable
number of layoffs that can be attributed to an easily identifiable new
regulatory provision.259 What is the cost to a rural business owner of
having to seek out more information about federal standards (likely with a
worse internet connection), consult expertise on such standards (though
lawyers are far harder to find in rural regions), and then, if necessary,
comply with the standards (at some expense that does not necessarily
involve layoffs)?260 A result that seems likely is that those with fewer
resources will have to fall by the wayside while those with more resources
can play the game by the new rules. The question, then, is whether rural
workers are inevitably destinated to bear disproportionate regulatory
trade-offs in certain contexts because cost-benefit analysis assumes urban
conditions and discounts suffering if it comes in smaller numbers.
b. Endangered Species Listings
Other regulatory processes minimize or overlook costs imposed on
rural communities as well. For instance, in The Costs of Critical Habitat,
Klick and Ruhl observe that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS),
which is charged with implementing the Endangered Species Act (ESA),
currently takes the position that designating certain geographic areas as
critical habitats for endangered species “entail[s] no incremental costs
beyond those already triggered by the original listing of the species as
endangered.”261 After assessing the effects of the critical habitat
designation on home values in four Arizona counties, their study
concludes that the designation reduced property values in those counties
by between three and four percent.262 They therefore conclude that the
FWS position is “in error,” and that such effects in fact render the critical
habitat designation to be “welfare reducing,” the agency having
underestimated the regulatory action’s economic effects.263
Returning to the livelihoods theme, the listing of the spotted owl as
an endangered species is largely considered old news at this point. But the
regional ramifications of this listing for timber communities remain

259. Cf. Sharon, supra note 106, at 581 (observing that “taken to the extreme, a
wholly preservationist world is devoid of people”).
260. Cf. WUTHNOW, supra note 3, at 101 (observing local officials’ frustration with
“unfunded mandates” from federal regulations, such as a requirement to install a new
sewage treatment plant, that communities could not afford).
261. Jonathan Klick & J.B. Ruhl, The Costs of Critical Habitat or Owl’s Well That
Ends Well (Nov. 20, 2020) (research paper, U. Penn. Inst. L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper No 2057).
262. See id.
263. See id.
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poignant. Sherman’s study of Golden Valley centered on the listing’s
lasting aftermath. She explains:
The 1990 listing of the northern spotted owl as threatened under the
[ESA] would alter the economic landscape of Golden Valley
irrevocably. The spotted owl decision . . . resulted in federally
enforced bans on timber harvesting through much of the Pacific
Northwest to preserve the owl’s habitat. This decision affected all of
the local public forests, which made up nearly 80 percent of the land
in Jefferson County [where Golden Valley is located]. Timber harvests
in the region dropped by 80 percent between 1989 and 1994 as a result.
The spotted owl ruling was destructive to virtually all aspects of
Golden Valley’s economy . . . . Most residents who were there at the
time remember the 1990s as a period of community-level depression,
from which they are still struggling to emerge.264

Recent commentary has observed that widespread unwillingness to
acknowledge the potential costs of environmental regulations such as
those implementing the ESA likely exacerbates public opposition to those
regulations. Henson, White, and Thompson, deeming the ESA to be the
“signature environmental law of the United States,” argue that while the
ESA has achieved meaningful ecological successes, it continues to face
opposition from substantial segments of the public in part because of the
unwillingness to acknowledge unintended consequences, including the
perceived and actual costs borne by rural landowners.265
Again, two unique rural factors suggest that rural communities bear
unique consequences of these decisionmaking processes. First, rural
residents have a greater tendency to be land rich but cash poor.266 Rural
livelihoods in ranching and farming, for instance, often involve a state of
illiquidity, with all of a family’s resources being “tied up in the land.”267
Thus, a phenomenon such as that observed by Klick and Ruhl bears unique
implications for rural economic welfare in particular, given
disproportionate rural reliance on land as both wealth and livelihood. And
second, rural residents are more likely not only to have resource-dependent
264. SHERMAN, THOSE WHO WORK, supra note 145, at 31.
265. See generally Paul Henson et al., Improving Implementation of the Endangered
Species Act: Finding Common Ground Through Common Sense, 68 BIOSCI. 861 (2018)
(arguing that ESA has been successful in meeting its core mission but improvements in
implementation could lessen political controversy and make ESA more effective).
266. Nathaniel Lee, Here’s Why the Ultra-Wealthy Like Bill Gates and Thomas
Peterffy are Investing in U.S. Farmland, CNBC (Aug. 20, 2021), https://cnb.cx/35vQXCT;
Jon Christensen, Land Rich, But Cash Poor, in the West, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 1997),
https://nyti.ms/3JZNnzH (noting tendency of Western ranching families to be “land rich
and money poor” with “everything . . . tied up in the land”).
267. Id.; Roger E. McEowen, The Illiquidity Problem of Farm and Ranch Estates,
AGRIC. L. & TAX’N BLOG (Aug. 19, 2021), https://bit.ly/3tXygkI.
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livelihoods, but also to be more generally “environmentally embedded,”
having more intimate and varied relationships with land and natural
resources in general than non-rural residents.268 Thus, restrictions on
people’s relationships with land and natural resources likely also represent
unquantifiable losses in livelihoods, cultural norms, and ways of life.
2. Regulatory Decisionmaking and Rural Environmental
Injustice
The issues driving the oversight of the economic regulatory tradeoffs borne by rural communities also help explain the regulatory state’s
limitations in addressing rural environmental injustice. The overarching
issue is that regulatory decisionmaking emphasizes aggregate welfare, in
turn embracing a utilitarian approach that justifies minority sacrifice in a
system Ashwood labels “tyranny of the majority,” drawing on Alexis de
Tocqueville.269 In other words, the regulatory state demonstrates a more
general lack of capacity (or political will) to meaningfully take
distributional considerations into account. 270
Jedediah Purdy offers an explanation for this failure: environmental
law and its associated regulatory decisionmaking apparatus were born
during a time period of relative national socioeconomic equality and
prosperity.271 It was, in fact, formed around the assumption that economic
inequality was declining.272 Questions of justice and distribution, then—
including economic trade-offs and the siting of hazardous facilities—have
been neglected by environmental agencies’ decisionmaking processes.273
Features of the regulatory state both implicitly and explicitly embrace
the worthiness of rural populations as sacrifices in the name of progress.
For instance, the Code of Federal Regulations mandates that nuclear power
plants must be located only in rural places.274 While some would point out
the logic in such an approach, such a practice can nevertheless help explain
rural disaffection from the regulatory state. Critiques of cost-benefit
analysis as failing to address environmental injustice number in the
many.275 For rural communities of color—the “minority of
268. See ASHWOOD, supra note 13, at 190.
269. Id. at 10.
270. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert R. M. Verchick, Inequality, Social Resilience
and the Green Economy, 86 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2018).
271. See Purdy, supra note 19, at 810.
272. See id. at 864.
273. See id. at 810.
274. See ASHWOOD, supra note 13, at 102 (citing Title 10, Part 50, Code of Federal
Regulations – “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities”).
275. See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Advancing Environmental Justice Norms, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 104 (2003); Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the
Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553,
1575 (2002) (explaining that “cost-benefit analysis rationalizes and reinforces” patterns of
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C. What Other Factors Might Explain Rural Communities’ Sense of
Structural Exclusion by the Regulatory State?
Much of the rural frustrations described above characterize the
regulatory state as very much present in their communities. But a
subjective sense of having been abandoned by the regulatory state also
finds footing in objective regulatory developments over the past halfcentury. The under-appreciated story of deregulation in rural decline
reveals a pattern of structural exclusion. An exploration of the late
twentieth-century legislative history of deregulation reveals a story of at
least some rural legislators fighting to keep their communities under the
protection of the regulatory state’s oversight of infrastructure industries,
and more often than not, losing that fight.
In the mid-twentieth century, the political tides had turned against the
aspects of the regulatory state that oversaw certain infrastructure
industries’ rates and service obligations.277 A movement born at the
University of Chicago popularized the intellectual framework now known
as law and economics. This movement and related rhetoric among
lawyers, economists, and conservative politicians insisted that economic
regulation was inefficient and undesirable for both service providers and
consumers.278 Public anger had also grown toward regulated industries,
which were often perceived as expensive and overly bureaucratized. Thus,
policymakers in the deregulatory era proceeded, step by step, to dismantle
the regulatory framework that had at least aimed to support, protect, and
grow rural communities, even if its mechanisms remained imperfect.
The rail companies of the 1970s in particular were facing a variety of
challenges. While rail travel and freight shipping were predominant
transportation modes until around 1930, the federal government actively
invested in and supported competing modes of transportation following
World War II. Highway development, automobile production, and airline
pollution being “dumped on the poor”); Catherine A. O’Neill, Variable Justice:
Environmental Standards, Contaminated Fish, and “Acceptable” Risk to Native Peoples,
19 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 3, 17 (2000); Joseph P. Tomain, Distributional Consequences of
Environmental Regulation: Economics, Politics, and Environmental Policymaking, 1 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 110 (1991).
276. ASHWOOD, supra note 13, at 172.
277. See Paul W. Barkley, The Effects of Deregulation on Rural Communities, 70
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1091, 1092 (1988).
278. William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic
Regulation in America, 35 YALE J. REG. 721, 771 (2018); cf. Peter H. Schuck, Book
Review, 90 YALE L.J. 702, 706 (1981) (reviewing JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION (N.Y. Basic Books eds. 1980)) (suggesting that the gains from the traditional
regulatory system were worth the costs).
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travel siphoned business away from the railroad companies, making them
increasingly less profitable. Rural communities in the 1970s were also
facing crises in rail transportation with shortages of freight cars, unreliable
service and deferred rail line maintenance, and abandonment of service
altogether on low-density branch lines.279
Some rail companies went bankrupt in the wake of this increased
competition.280 Other companies’ response to this competition was called
“slow motion abandonment” or “de facto abandonment” of their less
profitable lines, prior to seeking legal permission from the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) for official abandonment.281 This
“inevitable” slow abandonment would involve a sort of foot-dragging
approach to ensuring that the ICC would allow the company to abandon a
less-profitable line. Prior to applying to the ICC for permission, railroads
would first “stop spending any money to maintain a branch line, causing
it to literally fall apart,” thereby making service “progressively worse” and
making it unsafe for trains to be operated on the line. Once the rail
company had already ensured the branch was in disrepair and would be
particularly costly to maintain, it would then make a sympathetic-seeming
case to the ICC for abandonment, which the Commission would “almost
always approve.”282 This practice had deleterious effects on local shippers
who relied on freight service, either driving them away from using rail
service or driving the shippers out of business altogether.283
In response to these conditions, policymakers pursued the Staggers
Rail Act of 1980 (SRA), which would become one of the legislative
lynchpins of the deregulatory era. Congress had already begun
deregulating transportation industries with the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978.284 The congressional discussions surrounding the SRA resembled a
sequel, nearly 100 years later, to the discussions that led to the Interstate
Commerce Act (ICA). Where the ICA brought railroads under federal
control, the SRA would seek to set them (relatively) free, further setting
the stage for loosening federal oversight of other infrastructure industries.
While one might react to the conduct of railroad companies by
concluding they warranted less freedom, rather than more, policymakers

279. See L. Orlo Sorenson, Impacts of Rail Deregulation on Rural Communities, 15
POL’Y STUD. J. 760, 765 (1987) [hereinafter Sorenson, Impacts of Rail Deregulation].
280. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. H24,827 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1980) [hereinafter
Staggers Rail House Debates] (statement of Rep. Lee) (“We in the Northeast know
firsthand about the problems facing railroads. It was but a few years ago that the six major
railroads in the Northeast were bankrupt.”).
281. See id. at 24,840–41.
282. See id. at 24,840.
283. See id.
284. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 41713).
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favoring the SRA saw increased private discretion as the key to a better
transportation system.285 Proposed measures to make rail companies more
viable included giving “substantially reduced priority” to shipper (i.e.,
consumer) protection, reduced administrative control of potential
monopolistic practices, and reduced commitment to maintaining specific
services that would not otherwise be maintained.286 The proposed solution
to the above foot-dragging by rail companies was to allow the companies
to impose a surcharge on less profitable lines in order to cover the costs
they would otherwise be expending.287
The prospect of deregulating the railroads was controversial,
however, and advocates for rural interests and small towns early on
perceived the risks posed to them if regulators weakened the ICA era’s
mandates for non-discriminatory universal service at just and reasonable
rates. During debates in the House of Representatives during the fall of
1980, Michigan Representative Albosta raised poignant concerns about
the SRA’s potential impacts on various regions of Michigan. Albosta
noted, first off, that giving the railroads more freedom was not necessarily
the only and most obvious option for rail transportation reform, and that
“we could buy all the track to be abandoned in the country for the price of
10 miles of urban subway.”288 Albosta characterized the SRA as “like
major surgery: we are allowing railroads to cut off limbs to save the trunk.
Yet we could someday have the need and the ability to go back and save
those limbs.”289 He warned,
“We should cross off these tracks with caution, for we may never be
able to bring them back, even in an emergency . . . . Why destroy them
without at least waiting to see whether we truly need each limb, or
whether we can save the health of the American railroad system and
bring it back to a point where its arteries are full of life again, and the
trunk can support the limbs again?”290

Recognizing the potentially devastating regional effects of losing rail
access, policymakers discussed the possible scope and nature of future rail
line abandonments that would come with increased rail company
discretion. For instance, Albosta commented,

285. See Staggers Rail House Debates, 126 CONG. REC. H24,834 (daily ed. Sept. 9,
1980) (statement of Rep. Harkin) (“We must allow our railroads to have the flexibility to
succeed. We must create a climate that will see railroads desiring to expand, not looking to
get out of the business.”).
286. See Sorenson, Impacts of Rail Deregulation, supra note 279, at 765.
287. See 126 CONG. REC. 24,804, 24,840 (1980).
288. Id. at 24,870.
289. Id.
290. Id.
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There is no question in the minds of any of the people on that railroad
[from Cadillac to Grand Rapids, Michigan,] and there is no question
in the minds of the people who have designed this particular bill that
the shortline railroad’s future could be jeopardized. It is the only
railroad there and closing it will not only hurt the local economy of
Michigan but affect this country’s ability to bring rail traffic through
another route besides the Chicago gateway.291

Concerns such as these were answered with reassurance that line
abandonments would not become more likely. For instance, Congressman
Florio pushed back against Albosta’s worries, insisting that “we have more
than fully addressed that problem in this legislation . . . [with] a multitude
of programs, branch line assistance programs, and a rail banking provision
in the Amtrak Act . . . dealing with the opportunities to stop inappropriate
abandonments.”292 Similarly, Congressman Madigan remarked that rail
companies’ ability to charge a surcharge for less profitable lines would
help keep those lines running, and if not, that local commissions would
still be able to hold rail companies accountable for reduced quality in
service.293
Congressman Dingell of Michigan went further in his indictment of
aspects of the SRA. One of the central tensions of legislative debate pitted
a provision known as the Eckhardt amendment against a provision known
as the Staggers-Rahall-Lee compromise. The Eckhardt amendment,
according to a memo from Georgia Congressman Ginn to President Jimmy
Carter appealing for help opposing it, would “gut” the deregulation bill by
curtailing railroads’ freedom to set their own rates.294 The compromise, by
contrast, would shift power back to the rail companies by removing
geographic and product competition as considerations from
291. Id. at 24,840. Similar concerns had been raised on the floor of the Senate. South
Dakota Senator George McGovern observed,

Even from a purely social standpoint, ensuring the viability of the
Nation’s rail system is an essential step in preserving the vitality of
rural America. Railroads determined the settlement patterns in much
of the country, as elevators were built along branch lines, and
settlements sprung up at key junctions. A century later, the economies
of these rural towns still depend on their access to rail transportation.
Preserving the rural rail system is an indispensable part of the effort to
maintain rural vitality.
126 CONG. REC. 7,247, 7,274 (1980).
292. 126 CONG. REC. 24,804, 24,871 (1980). The Amtrak Act replaced the prior
system of regulated passenger rail system with a more limited system run by Amtrak, a
federally owned enterprise. See id.
293. See id. at 24,840–41.
294. See Memorandum from Congressman Ronald Ginn (Ga.), to President Jimmy
Carter, 175 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Sept. 4, 1980).
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determinations of market dominance—meaning railroads would be
considered market-dominant less frequently, thereby triggering ICC
intervention to regulate rates less frequently.295
In supporting the Eckhardt amendment, Dingell declared to his
colleagues that they had before them “a clear choice. If you go with
Staggers-Rahall-Lee, you will endorse a proposal written at the request of
Conrail—and other larger railroads—and one which allows for blatant
discrimination against small short line railroads, shippers, utilities and
consumers.”296 Although Dingell agreed “that railroads ought not be
forced to operate in the red,” he believed the compromise would “solve
the problem of a minor dislocation with major surgery” by creating “a
system whereby larger railroads—the Conrails and the Southerns—can
enrich their incomes.”297 But, Dingell opined, this was a Machiavellian
scheme where the end attempts to justify the means:
The provisions of the Staggers-Rahall-Lee compromise can be used in
a discriminatory fashion to allow large railroads . . . to force small
shippers to use other modes of transportation to pay exorbitant rates
thereby making them noncompetitive. At the same time, rates for
competing traffic can be held down leaving shippers with no other
alternative than to abandon the service of certain small short line
railroads to the whim and caprice of a larger monopolistic railroad.
The end result of this arbitrary and offensively discriminatory rate
manipulation is clear to me—wholesale abandonment of hundreds of
small short line rail carriers across the Nation, straight into the hand of
the railroad monopoly.298

The House ultimately adopted both the Eckhardt Amendment and the
Staggers-Rahall-Lee Compromise, weakening the Amendment’s
provisions and shifting the balance of power back toward the rail
companies.299 Concerns about rural vitality notwithstanding—likely
having been reassured by the protections built in for rural communities—
ninety-five percent of congressional representatives voted in favor of the
Staggers Rail Act in its final form.

295. Staggers Rail Act: Oversight, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com., Transp.,
and Tourism of the Comm. on Energy and Com. H.R., 98th Cong. 13 (1983) [hereinafter
Staggers Rail Act: Oversight] (Statement of Rep. Rahall).
296. 126 CONG. REC. 24,804, 24,840–41 (1980).
297. Id. at 24,841
298. See id. He continued, “I reiterate that my colleagues have a choice. You can
support the Eckhardt amendment which provides for a fair and expedited rate proceeding
in rate division cases of rate divisions between railroads or you can accept the StaggersRahall-Lee Conrail compromise which promotes arbitrary rate discrimination, demise of
smaller railroads, and wholesale abandonments of short line carriers.” Id.
299. Id.; see also Staggers Rail Act: Oversight, supra note 295.
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By the time the prospect of deregulating intercity bus service was
before Congress a mere year later, representatives of rural districts seemed
even more skeptical, having now seen both airline and rail deregulation
play out on the ground and after being promised that rural communities
would not be hurt.300 Legislative conversations surrounding what would
ultimately become the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 exhibited
similar themes, with legislative debate starting just a few months after the
election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency. One of the bill’s proponents
characterized the bill as “a natural extension of our efforts . . . to promote
flexibility in the regulatory structure surrounding the Nation’s
transportation industries.”301 Another proponent said the bill was “a
responsible effort that meshes both the philosophy of deregulation with
the practicalities of the Federal-State climate in which the intercity bus
industry has developed during the past half century.”302 The proposed bill
would relax entry requirements into the interstate bus industry, permit a
higher volume of intrastate busing, permit bus companies greater leeway
in abandoning their operations, and reduce federal oversight of prices
charged.303
Noting “the unorthodox manner in which this bill has been handled
and rushed through,” Missouri Representative Taylor remarked:
I do believe it is time that we slow down our urge to deregulate and try
to calm our deregulation fever. Rural America, especially, has been
hurt by our efforts at airline deregulation, and many Members have
personal experience with the inability of the airline industry to serve
small towns and small communities. In this regard, we were assured
several years ago by the administration and by the committee at that
time that small cities and towns would be served by commuter and
charter airlines since the big scheduled airlines had left their
communities. That simply has not happened, and I doubt that it ever
will. Now the committee comes to the floor in a heated rush with a bill
that could cause further damage to rural America’s transportation
systems. We have no airplanes in small towns and cities, and we will

300. See 127 CONG. REC. 28,181 (1981) (“West Virginia and many rural parts of our
Nation have indeed been impacted by airline deregulation, trucking deregulation, or loss
of train service through elimination of many Amtrak routes, and in many parts of this
country roads are very difficult and very expensive, if not downright impossible to build.
So for much of rural America the bus company is the only game in town. For many of our
14,000 small towns across America, this is the only game left in town.”).
301. Id. at 28,175 (statement of Rep. Anderson).
302. Id. at 28,177–78 (statement of Rep. Clausen).
303. See id. at 28,175. Debate in House of Representatives about Bus Regulatory
Reform Act of 1981, Nov. 19, 1981, p.28175. For abandonment procedures, “State denials
of the carrier’s application to discontinue its intrastate service over the same route are
presumed to be unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce and not in the public
interest.” Id.
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soon have fewer interstate and intercity buses. . . . Many people in this
Nation, especially in rural areas isolated from big population centers
and in small towns between major population centers, rely on wellregulated bus transportation systems. Most of these people, by the
way, are our senior citizens, those who would have to pay the high cost
of airline travel, and who cannot afford it even if airline travel were
still available.304

He added, “I think it is time for us to take a look and see whether in
our passion for deregulation fever we are in fact penalizing rural America
especially in serving their transportation needs.”305
Representative Kazen of Texas thanked Taylor for raising these
“flashing red lights,” observing that,
if this bill passes today in the form that it is written, we are going to
wake up tomorrow, those of us who represent rural districts, and find
out that we have no transportation whatsoever. Airlines do not stop,
the train does not stop, and now they are going to take the bus stops
away from us. You know, I heard a while ago a Member say the old
refrain about how are you going to keep them down on the farm. This
is the way you are going to keep them there, because they are not going
to have any way of getting out.306

Representative Roberts of Kansas pointed out that it had become
cheaper for him to fly from New York to Miami than the far shorter trip
from Dodge City to Wichita, and that trucking deregulation had made it
more costly to procure supplies for rural hospitals.307
Skeptics were once again given reassurance that the bill contained
enough safeguards to ensure service to rural areas and small towns.308 One
congressman replied to mention of the safeguards, “[R]ural America has
been hurt by deregulation. I realize the bill contains ‘safeguards’ designed
to protect rural communities but we have been down that road before.”309

304. Id. at 28,172 (Debate in House of Representatives about Bus Regulatory Reform
Act of 1981). At the beginning of debates, he said, “I would certainly urge everyone from
the rural areas to be here to listen to this, to be sure that you are adequately protected by
these safeguards that will be described by the Members who will be handling this bill on
the floor, because I think it is important that you satisfy yourselves that these protections
are there.” Id. at 28,173.
305. Id. at 28,172.
306. Id.
307. See id.
308. See id. at 28,181.
309. Id. at 28,173 (statement of Rep. Roberts of Kansas).
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Congresswoman Smith of Nebraska raised concerns about the bill’s
provision to permit the ICC to preempt state decisions on rates and rules.310
She explained,
If airline deregulation is the model for this legislation, then rural
Nebraska has nothing to hope for in terms of adequate and reasonably
priced transportation. Already, certain bus lines that have served my
State in the past are abandoning service to small communities. In most
cases, these bus companies were the sole source of public
transportation . . . . I make this point to show how eager these bus
companies are to abandon service to small communities and to show
how inadequate the so-called protection for small communities
provisions in this bill will be if they ever become law.311

She later added,
We were assured that rail deregulation was all taken care of with full
protection for communities that already had air service. But it has not
worked out that way. We have had no end of trouble. We have had
hearings. We have had hearings on subsidies. We have small airlines
that have gone out of business, they have gone broke. We have had
delays in getting answers. We have much poorer service than we did
before. I am now very much afraid that we will have less and less bus
service. We do not have air service and we do not have Amtrak. We
cannot leave rural America without service . . . . I urge a ‘no’ vote.312

Each time a new deregulatory measure was introduced,
representatives from rural areas raised fears about the likely harms that
would befall their constituents, although some were also “caught up in the
fervor for deregulation.”313 And policymakers from other areas did
recognize the risks deregulation posed to geographically disadvantaged
regions.314 Rural representatives were offered safeguards, usually in the
form of special assistance to be provided to small towns, or a promise to

310. See 127 CONG. REC. 28,181, 28,183 (1981). “The major opposition was found
in the ranks of legislators from rural states who feared loss of service to small towns and
cities without air or rail passenger service. These fears [we]re justified . . . . The [new] onesided appeal process for carriers mean[t] virtually unrestrained freedom to exit markets.”
William E. Thoms, Unleashing the Greyhounds—The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982,
6 CAMPBELL L. REV. 75, 97 (1984).
311. 127 CONG. REC. 28,184 (1981).
312. Id. Congressman Roberts of South Dakota stated, “I have severe reservations
about the deregulation of the intercity bus industry . . . . Complete deregulation . . . is
detrimental to the well-being of rural America.” Id.
313. Ganesh Sitaraman et al., Regulation and the Geography of Inequality, 70 DUKE
L.J. 1763, 1782 (2021).
314. See Sorenson, Impacts of Rail Deregulation, supra note 279, at 765 (“Although
concerns about the consequences of deregulation were expressed by agricultural and rural
interests, the advocates of change prevailed.”).
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study service abandonments in rural places.315 These conversations
continued as Congress marched down the path in the 1970s, ‘80s, and ‘90s
of deregulating additional transportation modes, telecommunications,
international trade, and agriculture.316
Today, whether economic deregulation is considered successful or
not depends upon who is asked and what that commentator is measuring.
Scholars have observed that it can be difficult to isolate and assess the
impacts of particular deregulatory measures in rural communities in light
of other factors that affect regional prosperity.317 Not every deregulatory
measure had the same impact, and some impacts were mixed. For instance,
in the freight-shipping sphere, some rural shippers seemed to benefit from
reduced freight costs in rail and truck transportation subsequent to rail
deregulation.318
Yet, deregulation’s tangible negative effects for rural communities
have revealed legislators’ pre-deregulation fears as sound. Rural
abandonment is easily observed in the transportation sector. Many shorter
railroad lines serving small rural communities were abandoned after the
SRA passed, although studies have suggested that small communities are
usually affected more psychologically than economically by rail line
abandonment.319 Following intercity bus deregulation in 1982, “the
number of rural communities served by long-distance bus service declined
sharply,” reduced by more than two-thirds, “with many of the service
discontinuations concentrated in rural communities.”320 Although Amtrak
promised to maintain a viable national passenger train system, and passes
through forty-seven states, “the majority of rural residents (almost 6 in 10)
live outside of its service area.”321 Indeed, “fewer than 200 nonmetro
315. See Sitaraman et al., supra note 313, at 1782.
316. See id. at 1785–1815.
317. See Barkley, supra note 277, at 1095.
318. See generally Bert J. Kellerman, The Impact of 1994’s Further Deregulation of
the Trucking Industry: The Rural Shippers’ View, 6 J. MKTG. THEORY & PRAC. 92 (1998);
Sorenson, Impacts of Rail Deregulation, supra note 279, at 775–76; L. Orlo Sorenson,
Book Review, 1 GREAT PLAINS RSCH. 174 (1991) (reviewing JOHN F. DUE ET AL.,
TRANSPORTATION SERVICE TO SMALL RURAL COMMUNITIES: EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION
(Iowa State Univ. Press 1990)) (explaining that studies indicated relatively little negative
effect on truck service following deregulation, with cost impacts either neutral or positive).
319. See Dennis M. Brown, Rail Freight Consolidation and Rural America, 13
RURAL DEV. PERSPS. 19 (1998); see also id. at 21 (“Immediately following passage of the
Staggers Rail Act of 1980, abandonments increased sharply for major railroads, growing
nearly 140 percent during 1980–85 compared with the previous 20 years.”); Sorenson,
Impacts of Rail Deregulation, supra note 279, at 775–76 (“Available evidence on relative
rail rate changes in grain shipment suggests a disadvantage for smaller rural communities
. . . . Hypothesized loss of special benefits of regulation of railroads for agriculture and
rural communities has not occurred because those benefits largely did not exist.”).
320. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RSCH. SERV., RURAL TRANSPORTATION AT A
GLANCE 4 (2005), https://bit.ly/3AHcvri.
321. Id.
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places are served by passenger rail service.”322 Ongoing federal support
for smaller airline service subsidizes a mere 135 rural destinations today,
mostly in Western regions and Alaska.323
The lens through which deregulation is assessed is important. While
ample commentary celebrates service providers’ and shippers’ increased
profits, less discussion centers on regional vitality and related concerns
like poverty. In all the literature on deregulation’s effects in rural
communities, a theme does emerge: deregulation meant reduced private
sector obligations to serve rural communities; rural communities often did
indeed receive less or worse service after deregulation; and deregulation
has thus been a central, albeit under-appreciated, factor in today’s
challenging rural socioeconomic conditions.324 Although not universally
and not uniformly, deregulation did, ultimately, contribute to rural
marginalization. As Sitaraman, Serkin, and Morgan observe, these
patterns held true across transportation, telecommunications, trade, and
antitrust.325 Deregulation also led directly to a rapid increase in corporate
consolidation, a matter which receives increasing scrutiny today in an era
of outsized corporate power alongside egregious social inequality.326
Given the priorities that policymakers chose despite the trade-offs—
a mass contraction of infrastructure industries, to the detriment of
geographically disadvantaged regions—the deregulatory era should be
understood as a decision to do less for rural communities in order to do
more for service providers, urban and suburban consumers, and other
perceived interests. While there might have been some wisdom or
necessity behind that trade-off, commentary on rural socioeconomic
marginalization should at least recognize this development as a choice
pursued with some knowledge of the risks. This regulatory retreat reveals
part of the story of the modern regulatory state’s tense relationship with
rural America.
Viewed holistically, this era involved a massive retreat of an
important component of the regulatory state from rural America. Before
322. Id.
323. See id.; see also Richard Beilock & James Freeman, Florida Motor Carrier
Deregulation: Perspectives of Urban and Rural Shipper/Receivers, 66 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON.
91, 97 (1984) (noting that although majority of shippers and receivers saw benefits from
deregulation, those that did not were concentrated in small communities).
324. Cf. JENNIFER SHERMAN, DIVIDING PARADISE, supra note 145, at 5 (discussing the
impacts of national and global economic restructuring on rural communities, including
increased poverty and unemployment in rural areas compared to urban ones).
325. See Ganesh Sitaraman et al., Regulation and the Geography of Inequality, 70
DUKE L.J. 1763, 1782 (2021); Surekha Carpenter & Sonya Ravindranath Waddell, The
Landscape of the Rural Fifth District: Does Race Matter?, FED. RSRV. BANK OF RICHMOND
(Mar. 11, 2021), https://bit.ly/3obtpJH (noting “40 percent of manufacturing employment
among the rural black population in the South was lost between 2001 and 2017”).
326. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 319.
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deregulation, rural communities were folded into the scope and protections
of this form of protective regulation; they were a central part of the
economic regulatory fabric. Post-deregulation, rural America became
aberrant—a special exception to this part of the regulatory system,
warranting special assistance, special reports, and special protections. In
addition to the tangible negative effects of deregulation and those effects’
downstream impacts—such as widespread loss of intercity bus service
making already struggling places less attractive and viable—rural America
was pushed to the periphery of the regulatory state’s protections. In other
words, the regulatory state’s retreat from rural America reflected
government’s reduced concern with rural space, physically, socially, and
legally—a form, that is, of structural exclusion. This regulatory retreat
juxtaposed alongside the regulatory encroachments described above may
help explain the seemingly contradictory sense of abandonment and
invasion expressed by many rural residents.
V.

JUSTICE-BASED PATHWAYS TOWARD REGULATORY LEGITIMACY

An emergent theme in the limited literature on the rationality of rural
populations’ skepticism of the regulatory state is this: socioeconomic
inequality, once considered outside the paradigm of the regulatory state,
must become centrally embedded into its priorities alongside other
objectives, such as environmental conservation and workplace safety.327
Injecting considerations of equality into the regulatory state can and
should come in several forms. Drawing on this literature and scholarship
on legitimacy and related concepts, this Part proposes three avenues to
help address rural disaffection from the regulatory state by helping the
regulatory state serve rural communities and other marginalized
populations more meaningfully.
Sections A–C below explore the following. First, where there has
been structural exclusion, there needs to be structural inclusion. This
structural inclusion needs to not merely make people “feel heard,” but to
allow them a path to actually influence outcomes of decisions that affect
them. Second, where geographic considerations and small-seeming costs
have been disregarded in the name of aggregate welfare, those costs need
to be taken seriously, with more robust efforts to both assess and offset
them. And third, in light of the overwhelming growth in socioeconomic,
racial, and geographic inequality over the same time period examined
here, and where there has been little effort to correct this concerning
concentration of resources, it is past time to consider more aggressive
schemes for more equitable distributions of resources across landscapes
327. Shapiro & Verchick, supra note 270; Purdy, supra note 19, at 810; Daniels et
al., supra note 18, at 7–8.

802

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 126:3

and populations, which also take into account the ongoing import of rural
populations, workers, and resources to issues of national sustainability.
In short, this Part explores the prospect of incorporating enhanced
procedural, distributive, and restorative justice into the regulatory state’s
relationship with rural America.
A. Procedural Justice in the Regulatory State’s Relationship with
Rural Populations
The procedural problems in rural relationships with federal agencies
are multifold. Processes are often perceived as top-down and uninformed
by local conditions. Where rural populations are included in
decisionmaking, it is a common perception that a box is being checked;
decisions have already been made, but federal regulators are holding
public meetings or other fora in order to make people “feel heard”—even
if they lack meaningful opportunities to influence actual outcomes.
The rural experience is consistent with now decades-old literature
raising alarms about democratic accountability in the regulatory state. This
democratic deficit is particularly concerning in rural regions, where
federal agencies often take on the roles and responsibilities traditionally
under the purview of local governments, but without the associated
intimacy and accountability of local governments.328
In the context of rulemaking and other policy formulations,
scholarship has explored options for making what is in general an esoteric,
detached, and inaccessible process more accessible to regular people. The
advent of e-rulemaking opened up rulemaking to entire new populations,
but providing input on rules is still very much the purview of “professional
commenters with major knowledge and resource advantages.”329 The
much-noted digital divide across urban and rural communities also makes
e-commenting less accessible to rural communities. The General Services
Administration has recently issued a proposal to make notice-andcomment rulemaking more deliberative, interactive, and responsive to
broader segments of the public.330 These steps toward a “deliberative
‘national town meeting’” sound promising for addressing procedural
equity for rural communities and others.331
In the more localized processes, the stories of successful federal-rural
engagement are often described as intimate and messy. Federal managers

328. See Su, supra note 3, at 872.
329. See Connor Raso & Bruce R. Kraus, Upvoting the Administrative State,
BROOKINGS (Apr. 2, 2020), https://brook.gs/3IykjOD.
330. See Modernizing Services for Regulation Management, 84 Fed. Reg. 72,364
(Dec. 31, 2019).
331. See Raso & Kraus, supra note 329.
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adjust plans and outcomes based on rural input.332 They become familiar
with local knowledge and conditions and incorporate that expertise into
decisionmaking, treating rural residents as peers or partners rather than
regulated entities. In short, rural populations are meaningfully included in
the federal regulatory apparatus, and the apparatus does more to hold itself
accountable to them. As one example, Rowe, Finley, and Baldwin describe
a success story of mixed-race rural participation in decisionmaking over a
proposed railroad expansion in which, after a series of meetings and
intensive engagements, local residents were able to prevent the
unwelcome and risky project.333
The question in the agency context is how to systematize these
messier, more intimate practices into formalized agency procedures. But
perhaps the answer lies in the fact that the strength in this approach is not
in procedural mandates.334 Rural disaffection provides a cautionary tale of
the risks of attempting one-size-fits-all policy solutions for governance
questions that are unique, sensitive, and variable. Thus, a more productive
path might entail leaning into the messiness of human-to-human
collaboration, emphasizing “[e]xperimenting agency-by-agency,” and
learning from successes as they come.335
Of course, an objection to more devolved, collaborative
decisionmaking within federal agencies is that it will be resource-intensive
and costly. But perhaps rural disaffection and its many social,
environmental, and political costs illustrate that such an investment would
be worth the potential trade-offs.
B. Distributive Justice in the Regulatory State’s Relationship with
Rural Populations
The discussion above touches on the crux of the distributional
problems with the regulatory state. Administrative law processes are
preoccupied with volume in numbers and aggregate welfare. While this of
course seems intuitive viewed through one lens, through the lens of
distributive injustice, it is deeply problematic. Minority groups are always
bound to lose, bearing disproportionate costs in the name of the majority.
This “tyranny of the majority” renders sacrificial populations mere
externalities in the march toward collective progress.

332. Cf. Firlein, supra note 14, at 350 (advocating that federal agencies use
geographically specific surveys in wolf conservation both to tailor programs to local
conditions and to signal to rural communities that their concerns matter and address local
feelings of helplessness by informing programs that serve their interests more effectively).
333. See Rowe et al., supra note 157, at 27–30.
334. See Bagley, Procedure Fetish, supra note 32, at 350.
335. See Parrillo, Should the Public get to Participate, supra note 87, at 124.
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But agency decisionmaking can do more to take distributional issues
and geographic considerations into account. The foundational step is to
take the costs that have historically been treated as minor or tolerable into
account in a meaningful way.336 There has been too much tolerance from
decisionmakers and commentators to allow people other than themselves
to lose livelihoods, for instance, or to bear the burdens of a local nuclear
plant. These costs—which have been rationalized or brushed away in the
name of the aggregate welfare—need to be taken seriously.
Richard Revesz has argued persuasively that distributional
consequences can and should be made a core concern of the regulatory
state, even though such a move challenges the longstanding orthodox view
within administrative law scholarship that distributional issues should be
dealt with through tax policy.337 Drawing on examples such as the Obama
administration’s efforts to revitalize struggling coal communities, Revesz
argues that we have models for using “coordinated mechanisms that could
be adapted to provide effective government-wide distributional
responses.”338 These mechanisms could be built into the executive branch
as “[a] new institutional structure” that would “proactively monitor
economically significant regulations for unusually large negative
distributional effects on particular groups” in order “to coordinate
appropriate executive responses” in the form of compensatory
measures.339 Of course, taking this one step further would be to recognize
that even small distributional effects on particular groups are worthy of
attention and offsetting measures.
This does not mean that regulations can never affect anyone or that
all possible costs must be offset or compensated. The natural concern here
is that necessary evolutions in regulatory policy will be impeded because
of a need to pay dues to every special interest and even the most minor
concern from an affected group. Yet, in this era when legislative
stagnation, political polarization, and other obstacles consistently impede
effective but necessary policymaking, it seems worth thinking more
creatively about distributional considerations in regulatory
decisionmaking.
C. Restorative Justice in the Regulatory State’s Relationship with
Rural Populations
Both before and after the federal political transitions of 2020 and
2021, the idea of a potential new rural agency or a “rural czar” has gained
some momentum as a possible avenue to address rural losses more
336.
337.
338.
339.

Cf. Revesz, supra note 18, at 1500.
See id.
Id. at 1578.
Id. at 1555.
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effectively than existing efforts have. Rural advocates and members of
Congress have pushed for President Biden “to appoint a rural envoy within
the White House to oversee a national strategy to uplift rural communities
facing severe health and economic challenges.”340 One commentator
proposed that Vice President Kamala Harris—“too smart and energetic to
be just the vice president”—should be given “a more important job” as
President Biden’s “de facto secretary of rural development, in charge of
closing the opportunity gap, the connectivity gap, the learning gap, the
start-up gap—the anger and alienation gap—between rural America and
the rest of the country.”341
One group of progressive rural activists, RuralOrganizing.org,
proposes that President Biden should create a national Office of Rural
Prosperity with the mandate “to address the unique structural challenges
of rural housing, education, healthcare, small business development, and
job creation.”342 The group proposes this move not only because of the
associated policy needs, but also because their extensive polling of more
than 7,000 rural residents suggested that these topics were what “mattered
most to them.”343
An organization doing parallel work focused primarily on fossil fuelreliant communities advances a similar proposal. The philanthropic Just
Transition Fund advocates the establishment of a White House Office of
Economic Transition “to address the crisis facing coal communities from
Navajo Nation to Appalachia and beyond.”344 The office would
“coordinate and oversee” a “new national community transition program
. . . to help synchronize ongoing efforts and leverage new public and
private sector investments.”345
Common themes across these proposals are that the current landscape
of federal rural development programs is piecemeal, scattered, and neither
ambitious nor effective enough to achieve the goal of counteracting
federally-exacerbated rural socioeconomic distress, not to mention the
need for radical restorative racial justice and an overarching goal of
supporting rural prosperity. The USDA “is most often tasked with leading

340. Liz Crampton, America’s Rural Crisis Triggers Calls for Biden to Name Rural
Czar, POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://politi.co/32JPwPH.
341. Thomas L. Friedman, Kamala Harris Deserves a More Important Job, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3IO6awX.
342. Matthew Hildreth, Joe Biden Should Pledge to Create a National Office of Rural
Prosperity, STORM LAKE TIMES (Sept. 9, 2020), https://bit.ly/33VJqfX.
343. Id.
344. NET Partners Urge Biden Administration to Set Up White House Office of
Economic Transition Now, NAT’L ECON. TRANSITION, https://bit.ly/3us0qoX (last visited
Feb. 11, 2022).
345. The Platform, NAT’L ECON. TRANSITION, https://bit.ly/3KVRIoA (last visited
Feb. 14, 2022).
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federal rural policy.”346 But the USDA’s status as the main avenue for rural
development is problematic in four main ways. First, the USDA itself has
a sordid history with active facilitation of racial discrimination, playing a
substantial role in Black farmers’ land dispossession. Second, the USDA
has not been given the tools to centralize and coordinate federal efforts on
rural development. Although the USDA is tasked formally with addressing
rural economic development, rural hunger, and other rural programs,
federal rural programs exist in multiple departments. Yet, “[w]ithout a
centralized interdepartmental agency or coordinating body to oversee
implementation—and comparatively little investment in rural
development research and policy development—it’s hard for tax dollars
tagged for rural places to make a real impact.”347
Third, in light of the dramatic transformation of the U.S. agricultural
sector over the past few decades, the USDA is an outdated locus for rural
development programming. In addition to its role in racial discrimination,
the USDA has also helped drive the farm consolidation that has driven
rural populations out of the countryside, detached farming practices from
local community attachment and investments, and exacerbated
agricultural pollution and environmental injustice. Thus, only six percent
of rural counties today are actually farm-dependent. According to
RuralOrganizing.org’s polls, “only one in ten rural voters think USDA
programs benefit small farms and small towns. Two-third[s] think that
USDA programs benefit big corporations and big farms instead of small
farms, small businesses, and rural Americans—and the rest don’t know
what to think.”348
The USDA’s ongoing centrality to federal rural development
programs is also harmful in that it continues to promote the misconception
among U.S. society as a whole that rural is synonymous with agriculture.
When urban and suburban residents see large federal subsidies directed to
“farms” and “farmers,” they may see this as rural residents and
communities receiving a windfall. This perceived windfall might make
urban and suburban residents skeptical of the idea that rural communities
need yet more public investments. In fact, most rural residents today work
in education, healthcare, and other social services. A better future for rural
communities does involve agriculture—ideally, investments and policy
support in sustainable, diversified agricultural programs that offer more
wholesome relationships than current colonial-extractive relations
between agribusinesses and local workers and communities. But a better
future for rural communities must also involve substantial non-agricultural
investments, particularly in the areas of natural resource conservation and
346. Hildreth, supra note 342.
347. Id.
348. Id.
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clean energy production, in addition to infrastructure development,
education, and healthcare.
The combination of the USDA’s problems alongside the emerging
chorus of voices demanding an avenue that is both more centralized and
more ambitious suggests that some kind of new apparatus is necessary,
whether it is a National Office of Rural Prosperity or a “de facto” Secretary
of Rural Development. The recent, massive set of benefits directed to rural
communities in the American Rescue Plan reflects an important step in the
direction toward restorative justice and meaningful, forward-looking
policies in rural communities.349 A federal agency devoted to managing
such programs in the future could go a long way toward restoring costs
borne by rural communities.
CONCLUSION
What should be done about rural disaffection from government? This
question drives much of the conversation on urban/rural tensions.
Unfortunately, many attempts to answer this question only scratch the
surface, inadvertently reifying an overly simplified stereotype that leads to
few meaningful answers. An over-emphasis on conservative, white, rural
anger diminishes meaningful rural concerns while simultaneously erasing
other rural views and communities, especially communities of color.
Reorienting this conversation toward more diverse, subjective
experiences alongside objective structural factors is more illuminating in
terms of what has happened to exacerbate urban/rural tensions and what
can be done about them. The regulatory state’s simultaneous abandonment
of, and imperfectly managed encroachment into, rural communities is one
such structural factor. Rural residents’ disaffection from the regulatory
state is not merely ideological, nor irrational. It is at least in part based on
real experiences and meaningful living conditions that are all too easy for
urbanites and urban-centric policymaking to overlook. The rural
relationship with the regulatory state is one characterized by a crisis of
legitimacy driven by experiences of exclusion, abandonment, and
disillusionment.
These findings are consistent with literature on the regulatory state’s
weaknesses to date in incorporating concerns of socioeconomic equality
and democratic accountability. If the regulatory state can take procedural,
distributive, and restorative justice more seriously—and it has ample
pathways to do so—it stands to heal its relationships with marginalized
communities and make more meaningful public contributions in rural
regions and beyond.
349. See Matthew Hildreth, How Biden Administration Can Maximize COVID Relief
in Small Towns, Rural Areas, GO ERIE (June 7, 2021, 2:53 PM), https://bit.ly/3ocRbEZ.

